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layout for the papers follows the target journals’ layouts, which is in all cases Springer 
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Empirical Research on Management Control 
1 Introduction 
Studies on the management control system have evolved since its first work published 
by Anthony (1965). Despite the adjustments to the definition of “management control,” 
the meaning has remained the same. According to Anthony and Govindarajan (2007), 
management control is the “process by which managers influence other members of the 
organization to implement the organization’s strategies.” Similarly, Merchant and van 
der Stede (2012) argue that the function of management control is “to influence 
behaviors in desirable ways” and note that the benefit of management control is “the 
increased probability that the organization’s objectives will be achieved.” What 
immediately becomes visible is the identical scope of both definitions: While Anthony 
(1965) speaks of “implement(ing)… strategies,” Merchant and van der Stede (2012) 
broadly discuss the achievement of “the organization’s objectives.” Both definitions 
exclude the strategic planning process, which usually results in setting new objectives. 
Other studies include the company’s vision and mission (Ferreira and Otley 2005; 
Ferreira and Otley 2009). Malmi and Brown (2008) consider elements of the strategic 
planning process as part of their management control system package framework. 
Most control frameworks share an instrument-oriented view. They describe the tools 
that managers can use to control other managers. In these frameworks, any control or 
tool can be classified as one matching category. Profit centers, for example, are result 
controls in the Merchant and van der Stede framework. Other examples are return 
measures, classified as financial measures in the Malmi and Brown framework. One 
framework that does not allow such a simple classification is the “Levers of Control” 
framework by Simons (1995). Rather, this framework is built around the different ways 
in which management control systems may be used (Gond et al. 2012). Belief systems 
are controlled by explicit assumptions and given values—a set of organizational 
definitions. Boundary systems are defined by formal rules and sanctions. Diagnostic 
controls provide a feedback on organizational performance, forming the basis to realize 
and analyze gaps. Finally, interactive controls emphasize the strategic uncertainties by 
discussing the results provided by the diagnostic control system. With such a 
framework, performance measures can be used diagnostically, interactively, or may 
even serve boundary purposes. This framework is more usage-oriented. This framework 
further complicates empirical research as it requires companies to be studied in further 
detail to carefully assess the true use of the control studied. 
Therefore, the guiding framework for this research is an instrument-oriented 
framework developed by Malmi and Brown (2008), which presents the most intuitive 
and recent framework by synthesizing nearly four decades of research. Other research 
includes Otley (1980) and Simons (1995). For reference purposes, this framework is 
depicted in Fig. 1. It essentially comprises three layers: administrative controls, 
(management) accounting controls, and cultural controls. 
Administrative controls include governance structure, organizational structure, and 
policies and procedures. The governance structure describes how the top management’s 
structure  
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Fig. 1 Management control systems as a package (Malmi and Brown 2008) 
and the board of directors influence managerial decision making. Abernethy and Wai 
Fong Chua (1996) present a study in which a change in the board ultimately resolved 
long-standing informal relationships between board members and lower-level 
managers. These changes resulted in an adjustment in the divisional structure of the 
organization, ultimately resulting in better resource management. The organizational 
structure describes the lines of authority and accountability within the organization, as 
well as the power distribution (Otley and Berry 1980; Alvesson and Karreman 2004). 
Miller and Friesen (1982) describe how organizational structures influence the degree 
of entrepreneurship or conservatism. An important element in organizational structure 
includes whether decision-making authority is centralized (Miller 1983). Policies and 
procedures specify how tasks or behaviors are to be performed and include standard 
operating procedures or rules (Malmi and Brown 2008). This control is popular in the 
Merchant and van der Stede (2003, 2012) framework as action controls. The 
formalization control is a heavily studied aspect of the policies and procedures control 
set. Several scholars investigate the impact of formalized long-term planning on the 
overall organizational performance (Armstrong 1982; Miller and Cardinal 1994). 
Accounting controls are sub-grouped into planning controls, cybernetic controls, and 
rewards and compensation. Planning is an ex ante form of control (Flamholtz, Das and 
Tsui 1985) that describes different control sets for long-term planning and action 
planning. Planning in terms of a planning horizon is divided into greater than or less 
than 12 months. The more long-term planning, or strategic planning, evolved in 
corporations, the more it became part of the management accountant’s work. Generally, 
strategic research can be grouped into content and process research. The former solves 
the question as to which strategies are to be pursued, while the latter analyzes all 
aspects of the planning process. This is the domain of strategic management accounting 
researchers. Several studies, such as Günther (1991) and Cadez and Guilding (2008), 
have studied strategic management accounting tools. Operational planning refers to 
short-term planning processes that are completed in a year. Accounting supports these 
planning processes by providing forecasts. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) highlight the 
importance of the awareness of the severe forecasting biases when forecast data are not 
rationalized with (further) external information.  
Cybernetic controls inherit their name from the traditional management accounting 
understanding of the cybernetic process. Green and Welsh (1988) define cybernetic 
control as “a cybernetic, regulatory process that directs or constrains an iterative 
activity to some standard or purpose.” They require each process described as a control 
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to have a feedback loop with standard sensors, discriminators, and effectors. Together 
with the measurement systems budgets, they should form such a feedback loop when 
the feedback from the measurement systems is utilized in the next budgeting period.  
Budgets have been extensively studied in terms of several dimensions: Fixed vs. 
flexible budgets (Sacco, Stalebrink and Posner 2011), slack (Kirby et al. 1991), 
participation (Brown, Evans III and Moser 2009), approaches used (Hansen 2011), and 
the resource being budgeted. Measurement systems may be designed to measure 
financial and non-financial indicators, or a combination thereof. Financial indicators 
include simple concepts for revenue or sales or more complex concepts such as the 
economic value added (Klumpes 2005). Non-financial indicators include all 
measureable aspects, such as process measures, human-resource measures, and 
customer-oriented measures (Amir and Lev 1996; Ittner and Larcker 1998a). Hybrid 
measurement systems combine both types of indicators. When derived from strategy, 
this type of measurement system is also known as a balanced scorecard (Kaplan and 
Norton 1992; Ittner and Larcker 1998b).  
Controls included in the cybernetic control module influence people’s behaviors by 
merely directing their intention, without further incentivizing organizational members. 
Reward and compensation, however, describe how incentives are used to influence 
employees’ behavior (Ittner, Larcker and Rajan 1997; Widener 2006). Although 
formularized regulations on bonus and compensation seem to very objective evidence, 
subjectivity may inhibit the weighting of individual bonus components (Ittner, Larcker 
and Meyer 2003). 
Finally, cultural controls can be categorized into clan controls, value controls, and 
symbol controls. Clan controls describe the informal social structures and “rely upon a 
relatively complete socialization process which effectively eliminates goal 
incongruence between individuals” (Ouchi 1979). Clan controls may be more effective 
than accounting or administrative controls, especially in teamwork environments 
(Kirsch, Ko and Haney 2010). To some extent, part of the clan concept of values 
impacts managerial behavior on three levels: deliberate recruitment of employees with 
matching values, socialization processes, and behavioral change to meet organizational 
expectations. The Levers of Control framework by Simons (1995) describes values as 
belief systems. Finally, symbols may be used to direct employee behavior by setting 
corporate identity or utilizing communication-oriented workplace design (Malmi and 
Brown 2008). 
2 Thesis Papers 
To date, only one publication has used the management control system framework 
developed by Malmi and Brown (2008). Petroulas, Brown and Sundin (2010) analyze 
how individual employee traits influence their preferences for specific control 
characteristics. Their paper only considers the accounting layer.  
This study tackles different sections of the “MCS as a package” framework. After 50 
years of research in strategic management, the strategic planning process design is still 
on the agenda for scholarly research. Using quantitative meta-analysis, “Design 
parameters of the strategic planning process and organizational performance” examines 
empirical studies on the relationship between organizational performance and design 
parameters of the strategic planning process. Design parameters refer to influence 
factors that can be controlled by a firm. Whereas existing literatures focus on the effect 
of strategic planning on performance, this meta-analysis considers the role of location 
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and participants in the strategic planning process, the distinct properties of strategic 
planners, and the intensity of the planning method used. Therefore, this paper 
incorporates elements of the cultural, accounting, and administrative layers of the 
“MCS as a package” framework. The cultural layer is invoked with the study of 
strategists’ consensus and risk preferences, which can be considered as clan and value 
controls. The planning method is an element of long-term planning controls contained 
in the accounting layer. Finally, structural elements are considered within the 
framework’s administrative layer. The effect sizes of existing primary studies are 
harmonized for better comparison and aggregated for total effect. The total effects are 
tested for significance and checked for homogeneity. This paper finds both significant 
and non-significant results across all layers. 
Existing research on the effect of the top management team (TMT) in a firm on 
management control systems is scarce. Both the upper echelons and attention-based 
theories promise to facilitate theory building in this stream of research. “CEO Duality, 
TMT Composition, and Management Control in Low- and High-risk-taking Firms” 
clarifies the relationship between the composition of TMTs and the configuration of 
management control systems. Within the “MCS as a package” framework, the paper 
considers planning and cybernetic controls—especially budgetary controls. It also 
considers the power-structure-biasing effect of CEO duality. Survey data from 97 
companies as well as publicly available data are used to empirically clarify whether 
CEO duality and TMT composition affect the setup of management control systems. 
The results show that dual CEOs use their power to limit the rational approach of 
forecasting and budgeting and instead facilitate efficient management control 
orientation. Certain TMT compositions also support this efficiency orientation; 
however, these TMT compositions positively influence the rational approach of 
forecasting and budgeting. Therefore, nearly all relationships identified are moderated 
by firms’ risk-taking orientation. Therefore, including risk taking as a moderating 
variable is recommended. 
Most literature on content research in long-term planning (strategic planning) 
provides advice on specific strategies. However, on a more abstract level, it is useful to 
know how to achieve continued corporate entrepreneurship, without overly 
emphasizing recommended strategies. Paper 3, “Management Control, Entrepreneurial 
Orientation, and Moderating Influence of Participation,” studies the relationship 
between entrepreneurial orientation and management control systems. Although the 
performance relevance of entrepreneurial orientation is undisputed, few studies have 
examined how management control systems are related to this orientation. The concepts 
of control or entrepreneurial orientation vary significantly among these studies. This 
paper adapts the “management control as a package” framework and considers 
individual sub-dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation. The effect of management 
controls depends on the effectiveness of employee motivation to respond to these 
controls. In addition, this paper shows how control effects can be increased by allowing 
the participation of lower-level managers in the resource allocation process and 
contributes to the ongoing research on the organizational slack. Empirical data from 
178 companies were used to answer these research questions. 
3 Conclusion 
In addition to the new framework developed with the “Management control systems as 
a package” framework, the main point put forth in Malmi and Brown (2008) was the 
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study of management control systems as a package. All papers included in this thesis 
consider more than one control. The second and third papers allow for a comparison of 
the impact of the different controls with each other. Moreover, these papers incorporate 
each other’s control as a moderator or lever to be considered simultaneously with all 
other controls. The second paper presents the risk-taking propensity, considered as a 
corporate value, if explicitly encouraged, or an element of clan controls, if it is the 
result of a socialization process. The third paper more evidently presents budgetary 
participation as a control that may be considered as an element of the cybernetic section 
of the accounting layer in the Malmi and Brown (2008) framework. 
The first paper contributes to the existing literature on strategic planning and 
summarizes findings on important design parameters that influence organizational 
performance. It therefore may help practitioners to identify relevant design parameters 
as well as researchers to identify linkages that are worth more in-depth study. The 
second paper contributes to the research on both management control systems and top 
management teams. For management control researchers, it demonstrates antecedents to 
management controls that were previously understudied and which are important to 
consider when comparing different companies. For top-management researchers, it 
presents more examples on how top managers use their power and information needs to 
influence organizational processes. The third paper contributes to both the 
management-control and the entrepreneurship-research communities. For management 
control researchers, the most relevant conclusion is that the effect of some individual 
control is leveraged by combining it with another control, in this case budgetary 
participation. Management control researchers should also take keen interest in the 
potential outcomes of the use of certain controls. The business community benefits 
from learning how to set up organizational processes to achieve entrepreneurial 
orientation. Finally, this information may also be useful to practitioners. In their meta-
analysis, Rauch et al. (2009) show an overall effect of .242 on organizational 
performance for entrepreneurially oriented companies. This clearly demonstrates the 
importance of this type of orientation. 
Management control systems, as a package, are an increasingly important topic in 
management accounting research. With the papers contained in the appendix, this thesis 
strives to provide a strong contribution to this research stream. 
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Design parameters of the strategic planning process and 
organizational performance – A quantitative analysis of 
empirical research 
Sandro Kürschner / Thomas Günther 
Zusammenfassung Die Gestaltung strategischer Planungsprozesse wird auch fast 50 
Jahre nach dem Entstehen des strategischen Managements immer noch in der For-
schung diskutiert. Mittels einer quantitativen Metaanalyse werden in diesem Beitrag 
empirische Studien zum Zusammenhang von Unternehmenserfolg zu einzelnen Para-
metern des strategischen Planungsprozesses untersucht, die vom Unternehmen beein-
flussbar sind. Während das Schrifttum sich in primär narrativen Literaturüberblicken 
nur mit dem Effekt der Existenz einer strategischen Planung beschäftigt hat, betrachtet 
die Metaanalyse auch den Ort und die Beteiligten des strategischen Planungsprozesses, 
einzelne Eigenschaften strategischer Planer als auch die Intensität der Planungsmetho-
dik. Effektstärken vorliegender Primärstudien werden zur besseren Vergleichbarkeit 
vereinheitlicht und zu einem Gesamteffekt aggregiert, der auf statistische Signifikanz 
und Homogenität der Ergebnisse überprüft wird. 
Schlüsselwörter Strategische Planung ⋅ Metaanalyse ⋅ Planungsprozess ⋅ Effektstärke ⋅ 
Erfolg ⋅ Literaturüberblick 
Abstract After 50 years of research in strategic management, the design of strategic 
planning processes is still on the agenda for scholarly research. Using a quantitative 
meta-analysis, we examine empirical studies on the relationship between organizational 
performance and the design parameters of the strategic planning process that can be 
controlled by a firm. Whereas existing literature reviews focus on the effect of strategic 
planning on performance, this meta-analysis also considers the role of the location and 
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1 Underlying problem 
1.1 Strategic management and strategic planning process 
Strategic management is a consistently topical research stream, as evidenced by recent 
publications on the financial crisis (e.g., Wilson and Eilertsen 2010). Strategic man-
agement research can be distinguished into research on critical success factors and 
research on the strategy process (Huff and Reger 1987). The first stream of research 
attempts to generate knowledge on the content of strategies. In contrast, strategy-pro-
cess research, which is the focus of this paper, is dedicated to efficiently searching for a 
strategy. Models of the strategic planning process can emerge from either a prescriptive 
or a descriptive perspective. Prescriptive models construct planning processes based on 
formal models of decision theory (e.g., Gilmore and Brandenburg 1962; Learned 
et al. 1969; Ansoff 1965; Cohen and Cyert 1973; in the German-language literature e.g., 
Schreyögg 1984 and Günther 1991), whereas descriptive models address a more un-
conscious and gradual development of strategies (e.g., Bower 1970; Mintzberg 1977; 
Quinn 1978; Burgelman 1983). Strategic planning processes are discussed in both stra-
tegic management literature (e.g., Huff and Reger 1987, Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst 2006) and management accounting research (e.g., Malmi and Brown 2008). 
In the German-language literature, this discussion is also part of the “strategic con-
trolling” concept as an interface between the two research areas (e.g., Baum et al. 
2007). “Strategic controlling” attempts to plan and control strategies and their imple-
mentation in a cybernetic control cycle. “Strategic planning”, in the context of this 
paper, is synonymous with the strategic planning process of a firm, which includes the 
strategic control process as a feedback loop. In the management control literature, this 
is described as the “strategic controlling process” (Langguth 1994; Baum et al. 2007). 
However, the understandings and definitions of these research streams overlap. 
Textbooks on strategic management (e.g., Müller-Stewens and Lechner 2001; Welge 
and Al-Laham 2007; Bea and Haas 2009; Hungenberg 2010) examine and recommend 
the application of diverse design parameters, which are derived from single studies. In 
the context of this paper, “antecedents” are understood as parameters that generally in-
fluence the nature of strategic planning processes. “Design parameters” are the para-
meters that can be determined by the firm, in contrast to external environmental factors, 
which are outside of the firm’s control.  
Empirical studies exist for some, but not all, of the design parameters. Thus far, a 
comprehensive view of the results of the strategic process literature is missing. The 
question of the impact of various design parameters and of the benefits and drawbacks 
of alternative design parameters remains unanswered. This paper closes this gap by 
identifying the design parameters of strategic planning that have a positive effect on 
organizational performance. “Organizational performance” is defined as the opera-
tional, financial and formal objectives of the firm, such as net income and liquidity, and 
their determinants. Business objectives (e.g., the market share or quality targets of the 
firm or its product groups) and social objectives (e.g., employee satisfaction or corpo-
rate social performance) are not regarded as “organizational performance” in the con-
text of this paper (for a discussion of various objectives, cf. Baum et al. 2007, p. 10f). 
One prominent design parameter is the question of whether strategic planning is nec-
essary. Several literature reviews have examined this topic (e.g., Boyd 1991; Schwenk 
and Shrader 1993; Miller and Cardinal 1994) and have identified significant and posi-
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tive effects of strategic planning. As the following sections will demonstrate, the design 
parameters that have been identified and analyzed include the location of strategic 
planning within the organization, the structure, teamwork and risk-taking propensity of 
the planning team and the formalization, rationality and intensity of strategic planning. 
1.2 Related research and structure of the paper 
An overview of empirical studies of German-language management accounting re-
search on planning processes is provided by Weißenberger and Löhr (2007). The styl-
ized facts derived in this overview focus not only on strategic planning processes but 
also on firms’ general planning processes. Thus, the authors consider operational and 
tactical planning processes as well as project planning. After grouping the results, they 
derive brief conclusions, but they do not present the quantitative effect sizes. 
Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006) present a comprehensive literature review of 
existing studies in strategy-process research. Based on the results of the studies ana-
lyzed in their review, they derive a framework for content and process research and for 
the structure of the underlying studies. They provide a comprehensive overview of the 
state of the art of current research, but they do not report the effect sizes of the studies 
under review. Some literature reviews and meta-analyses have examined the intensity 
and rationality of the strategic planning process (e.g., Armstrong 1982; Shrader et al. 
1984; Pearce II et al. 1987; Schwenk and Shrader 1993; Miller and Cardinal 1994). 
These studies are limited to the properties of the planning method and generally show a 
positive impact of a formal and rational strategic planning process on performance. The 
studies analyzed in the above reviews and meta-analyses as well as additional primary 
studies are discussed in section 4.3.1. 
Of the broad range of empirical primary studies, we analyze only those that examine 
the interaction of design parameters and organizational performance and that analyze 
these interactions using statistical confirmatory methods. Only empirical cross-sectional 
studies were considered for this analysis in an effort to derive valid and generalizable 
conclusions. This paper contributes to current research in the following ways: 
 This paper is not focused on interactions between one single design parameter of the 
strategic planning process (e.g., the formalization) and organizational performance, 
but considers a set of parameters derived from a comprehensive framework. 
 Primary qualitative literature reviews are expanded by a quantitative analysis of the 
effect sizes of the impact of design parameters on organizational performance. To 
improve the comparison, the from study to study different interaction measures are 
translated into uniform effect sizes. 
 As far as possible so far isolated effect sizes of single primary studies are aggre-
gated for a total effect and statistically tested for the significance and homogeneity 
of the total effect.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. To systemize the multitude of single empirical ef-
fects, a common framework is needed to structure the design parameters of strategic 
planning processes. Because the literature offers various suggestions, we review the 
current literature in section 2 to derive a feasible framework for further analysis. The 
third section presents quantitative meta-analysis as a method and procedure to trans-
form different statistical measures to comparable effect sizes. Section 4 analyzes and 
discusses the impact of design parameters on organizational performance, as demon-
strated in the reviewed primary studies. The paper concludes with considerations of the 
limitations of our analysis and recommendations for future research. 
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2 Development of a framework and literature review 
2.1 Classification of antecedents of the strategy process 
The literature presents various views and classifications of antecedents of the design 
of strategic planning processes. Based on planning systems in general, Tochter-
mann (1990) derives design parameters of the strategic planning process. His analysis is 
based on previous work by Szyperski and Müller-Böling (1980) on planning organiza-
tion, abbreviated PLORGA. He applies the seven dimensions, planning system, plan-
ning bodies, planning tasks, planning team, planning technology, planning process and 
degree of formalization, to strategic planning (Tochtermann 1990, p. 22 ff.). The 
PLORGA concept is, at first glance, quite general. However, the concept can easily be 
applied to strategic planning through the planning level of the dimension planning sys-
tem. The other dimensions of planning are capable of thoroughly describing the strate-
gic planning process. 
Following their work in 1999 on the design parameters of strategic processes, in 
2001, Lechner and Müller-Stewens (Lechner and Müller-Stewens 1999) suggested a 
framework of six dimensions (Müller-Stewens and Lechner 2001, p. 58 ff.). Location is 
the context of strategy development within the firm, including the responsibilities and 
directions in which influence is exerted. Participants comprise the persons involved, 
their capabilities and the mix of participants’ different perspectives. For the timing the 
duration, the trigger and the planning horizon of strategic initiatives must be deter-
mined. The selection of resources and of applied methods affects the strategic planning 
process through the resource dimension. The procedure model is influenced by the 
working principles, the style of presentation and the degree of structurization. The last 
dimension is teamwork, which considers the planning teams and the intensity of con-
flicts within the team, the method of decision making and the transparency of the 
strategic planning process to outsiders. 
In a structured literature analysis using stylized facts on the strategic and operational 
planning processes of 15 German-speaking management accounting research studies 
between 1990 and 2007, Weißenberger and Löhr (2007) identify the antecedents of the 
planning processes with impact on organizational performance as rationality, intensity, 
openness, integration, duration, opportunism and the slope in competency. 
On the basis of meta-models of German-language planning research, Hamann and 
Günther (2009) develop a framework for future planning research. They differentiate 
five formal sub-systems: planning and reporting systems, planning and control bodies, 
planning and control instruments, planning and control activities and the formalization 
system. The authors suggest 31 indicators of how these sub-systems can be operational-
ized. The classification is similar to the PLORGA concept in that it is feasible for both 
operational and strategic planning, but it is particularly applicable to strategic planning 
processes. 
All of the dimensions suggested by the above-mentioned authors are within the 
scope of the firm’s control. However, a question arises regarding the existence of addi-
tional antecedents that originate in the environment of the firm. 
This question was addressed very early by Hofer (1975), who transferred contin-
gency theory from organizational science to research on strategic management. The 
situative or contingency theory approach explains different organizational structures 
based on differences in the situational context, which may be internal or external and 
may be affected by multiple factors simultaneously (cf. Burns and Stalker 1961; 
Woodward 1965; Lawrence and Losch 1967). The contingency approach has been used 
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as a theoretical foundation manifoldly both in management accounting (e.g., Water-
house and Tiessen 1978; Otley 1980; Chenhall 2003; Gerdin and Greve 2004) and 
strategic management (e.g., Hofer 1975; Pettigrew 1997; Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst 2006). One of the objectives of this theory is to adjust the organizational 
structure to the environment as much as possible. Following structural contingency 
theory, this is called “selection fit” (Donaldson 2001; Vahs 2001, p. 38 ff.). Hofer 
identifies the environment and organizational structure as essential contingency factors 
for corporate strategy (Hofer 1975, p. 808). Ginsberg and Venkatraman (1985) add 
organizational performance as a contingency variable. Their model considers the con-
tent of the strategy itself an antecedent to organizational structure and organizational 
systems. In total, these authors identify four dimensions: corporate environment, corpo-
rate organization, the development of firm value and selected strategy content (Gins-
berg and Venkatraman 1985, p. 423). 
Although Ginsberg and Venkatraman’s (1985) antecedent dimensions were origi-
nally developed to analyze strategy content, these dimensions are well suited to analyze 
the strategy processes and had been used by other authors (Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst 2006). Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst divide the antecedent dimensions 
into antecedent factors and direct strategy process factors. Antecedent factors include 
environmental context, strategic context (defined as the current positions and moves of 
the firm), static and dynamic organizational characteristics, and organizational per-
formance. The direct factors that affect the strategy process include the strategist’s 
static characteristics, the strategist’s personal and cognitive context, issue characteris-
tics, process characteristics, and process-outcome characteristics (the speed and qual-
ity of decision making). Similarly, Kranz (2007) identifies as antecedents the environ-
mental conditions, organizational conditions, the content of the business strategy, the 
characteristics of the decision maker and the decision itself, including the urgency and 
insecurity regarding a decision or the frequency of repetition. 
Referring again to structural contingency theory (Donaldson 2001), in this paper, we 
consider the antecedents that have been analyzed for their impact on organizational 
performance. Therefore, we analyze the “interaction fit”, the optimal fit of environ-
mental and design parameters for organizational performance. If several design parame-
ters are analyzed at the same time, we look for the “system fit” or “the multiple fit”, 
following Donaldson (2001). Table 1 summarizes the different and partially non-con-
gruent classifications of the antecedents of the strategy process. 
2.2 Framework for further analysis 
To identify a framework for further analysis, a compromise must be made between 
coverage of the broad diversity of all aspects and their aggregation into a feasible order 
for a framework. We identify similarities between the various authors and group their 
approaches (Table 1). The analysis shows that environmental and problem-related char-
acteristics are not considered by some approaches, which therefore neglect contingency 
theory. Because this study examines the antecedents of the strategy process that are 
within the firm’s scope of control and design (design parameters), the environmental 
and problem-related characteristics are not further considered because they cannot be 
controlled by the firm. Of course, it could be argued that the environment and the 
strategic problem can be influenced by repositioning the firm. Nevertheless, this influ-
ence is a result of the strategy process and should not be regarded as part of the design 
parameters of the process. 
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As Table 1 shows, the design parameters of the strategic planning process can be 
classified into three groups: the “organizational properties” (where is the planning 
done?), the “strategist’s properties” (who does the planning?) and the “planning 
method’s properties” (how is the planning done?). This framework underlies the fol-
lowing quantitative literature review. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Selection of literature for the analysis 
To identify empirical studies, a multi-level procedure based on the common procedure 
for a systematic literature review was chosen (e.g., Hart 2001, Tranfield et al. 2003, 
Thomas 2004; the presentation of the selection process follows David and Han 2004, p. 
42ff.). 
1. In a first step, the existing literature was explored, and essential key words and 
search strings were identified.1 
2. Next, primary studies with key words in the titles and abstracts were searched. 
3. Because the identified studies analyze the interaction between more than one de-
sign parameter and organizational performance, in a third step, each single in-
teraction was identified and classified within the framework. 
4. Finally, using additional key words, an sophisticated literature search for further 
studies on single design parameters was added by analyzing the reference lists 
and journals of collected primary studies. 
Using the identified key words, the research was performed with the help of the Busi-
ness Source Complete (via EBSCO Host) and ABI/Inform databases. Google Scholar 
was used to complete the collection of primary studies, but only previously published 
articles were included. This paper does not intend to provide an overview of all of the 
design parameters of strategic planning; this would not be possible due to the enormous 
amount of existing literature. Thus, in this paper, only primary studies with a statistical 
exploration of the interaction with organizational performance were included, similar to 
other literature reviews that have focused on the performance impact of strategic plan-
ning (e.g., Schwenk and Shrader 1993; Miller and Cardinal 1994). Thus, the following 
filters were defined for the literature search.  
                                                          
1
  The following key words were used for the search: corporate planning, policy mak*, strategist*, 
strategiz*, structur* chang*, strateg* action, strateg* chang*, strateg* choic*, strateg* craft*, strateg* 
deci*, strateg* form*, strateg* implement*, strateg* lead*, strateg* learn*, strateg* mak*, strateg* 
manag*, strateg* origin*, strateg* plan*, strateg* process*, strateg* renew*.  
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Table 1: Classification of antecedents of the strategic planning process in the literature (in chronological order) 
 
 
 
Range of control of the firm Antecedents of the environment and 
the strategic problem 
 Source  
Organizational properties 
(Where is the planning done?)  
Strategist’s properties  
(Who does the planning?)  
Planning method’s properties 
(How is the planning done?)  
Ginsberg and 
Venkatraman (1985)  Corporate organization    
Corporate environment 
Development of firm value 
Strategy content 
Tochtermann (1990)  Planning bodies  Planning team Planning system Not considered 
         Planning tasks  
         Planning technology  
         Planning process  
         Degree of formalization   
Müller-Stewens and  Location Participants Timing  Not considered 
Lechner (2001)      Teamwork  Resources   
       Procedures  
Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst (2006)  
Static characteristics of the 
organization  
Dynamic characteristics of the 
organization 
Process characteristics Environmental context 
Strategic context 
      
Static characteristics of the 
strategists Process-outcome characteristics 
Organizational performance 
Issue characteristics 
      Context of the strategist   
Kranz (2007)  Organizational conditions Characteristics of decision 
makers  
Characteristics of the decision Environmental conditions 
Content of business strategy 
Weißenberger and  Planning integration Planning openness Planning intensity Not considered 
Löhr (2007) Slope in competence Opportunism Planning rationality  
  Planning duration  
Hamann and  
Günther (2009) 
Planning and control bodies Planning and control bodies Planning and reporting system 
Planning and control instruments 
Not considered 
   Planning and control activities  
  Formalization system  
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• An included primary study had to offer the possibility of categorizing the 
investigated design parameters according to their impact on organizational per-
formance. Studies that examined “only” design parameters or were related to 
other dependent variables were not considered. The criteria for organizational 
performance were broadly defined, as shown in Table 2. 
• Primary studies had to recognize a relationship to strategic planning beyond 
merely mentioning key words such as “strategic”. 
• Included studies had to be part of strategy-process research. Articles from the 
strategy-content research stream were excluded. 
• The objective of the paper is to provide general recommendations for the design 
of strategic planning processes. Therefore, case studies with low sample sizes 
were not included in the analysis. 
• Purely descriptive papers on the strategic planning process were not considered. 
In empirical studies, interactions had to be explored using statistical confirma-
tory methods to derive effect sizes. 
• The empirical evidence had to be collected in field studies. Studies using labora-
tory designs were not included in the analysis. 
• Relevant publication media included only reviewed journals or dissertations be-
cause both involve a review process and provide the expectation of higher pub-
lication quality. 
 
Organizational performance can be measured directly as well as indirectly. For the 
direct measurement, most studies use financial accounting ratios or capital market ra-
tios, as Table 2 shows. The indirect measurement uses general assessments of manage-
ment collected in field studies. The latter method has the disadvantage of subjectivity 
and informant bias, which is resolved by adding an objective external measure of per-
formance in most studies. 
Table 2 Operationalizations of “organizational performance” in primary studies 
Criteria 
Objectively measured 
(Financial ratios or capital market data) 
Subjectively measured 
(e.g., management survey)  
Earnings  Earnings Earnings 
Past earnings 
Net sales  Sales  
Sales growth Sales growth 
Past sales growth 
Sales growth relative to industry 
Accounting  Return on sales 
return rates Return on equity 
Return on assets Return on assets 
Return on working capital  
Value-based  Market to book ratio  
measures Shareholder value growth 
Other  Aggregated ratios of different single ratios Aggregated ratios of different single 
ratios 
General assessment of the firm  
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Organizational
properties
(Where is the
planning done?)
Strategist‘s
properties
(Who does the
planning?)
Planning methods 
properties
(How is the planning
done?)
Planning location
Involved planners
(functional
diversification)
Teamwork
Risk taking
propensity
Formalization of
strategic planning
Intensity of strategic
planning
Rational vs. 
emergent strategic
planning processes
Design parameters of the strategic
planning process
 
Fig. 1: Framework for research 
As a result of the literature search, 70 primary studies containing a total of 88 analyzed 
interactions of design parameters and organizational performance were identified. Of 
these studies, 52 had not been included in previous literature reviews. When the studies 
are associated with the above framework (Table 1), we obtain a framework for research 
(Fig. 1). Fig. 1 shows that some potential fields of research in Table 1 have not been 
previously explored in empirical studies or did not meet the selection criteria for the 
meta-analysis. The last step of the systematic literature review, following Trenfield et 
al. (2003), is the extraction of the essential results of the primary studies and their anal-
ysis, which is described in section 4. 
3.2 Meta-analysis as a means of quantitative analysis of empirical research 
Narrative reviews and quantitative meta-analyses were used for the analysis of the liter-
ature. Narrative reviews comprehensively analyze the literature on a given research 
question. The dominant linguistic analysis carries the risk of subjective distortions of 
research results (Rustenbach 2003, Schulze 2004). By using a meta-analysis, the re-
search results are integrated at the level of statistical measures. In general, this is ac-
complished by the measurement and aggregation of effect sizes for a specific interac-
tion to produce a total effect (Bortz and Döring 2006, p. 672). 
A narrative review is an appropriate research method for an overview of the design 
parameters of strategic planning because of the breadth of the potential parameters. To 
compensate for the disadvantage of the lack of transparency and potential subjectivity, a 
meta-analysis was performed. Within the groups in the framework, the effect sizes of 
the primary studies were harmonized and aggregated for a total effect. When interpret-
ing the results, it must be considered that a low sample size and heterogeneity in pri-
mary studies can limit the conclusions drawn from the total effect. Thus, confidence 
intervals and statistical heterogeneity tests were added to assess the statistical signifi-
cance of the total effect. 
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3.3 Combining effect sizes 
3.3.1 The necessity of effect sizes 
The results of empirical management studies are often analyzed with the sole question 
of whether they identified significant effects. The calculation of the significance level 
varies by the testing procedure. However, in addition to the size of the effect, the sam-
ple size is an integral part of the significance level. This may lead to situations in which 
an effect found in a large sample is significant despite its very small size, and vice 
versa. In a meta-analytic study, only the effect size is initially of interest, with no refer-
ence to the sample size. Sample size becomes relevant in a second step, when a suffi-
cient number of studies can be obtained to usefully combine the single effect sizes. 
Sample size then takes the form of a weight for the effect size (Borenstein 2009, p. 223; 
Bortz and Döring 2006, p. 676). 
Most meta-analyses combine effects based on bivariate product-moment correla-
tions. Even if no correlations are published in primary studies, it is possible to trans-
form the published effect size into a measure that is comparable to the product-moment 
correlation using the following methods. The determined effect is represented as ∆, fol-
lowing Bortz and Döring (2006). 
3.3.2 Bivariate product-moment correlation 
The product-moment correlations reported by a study can be directly used as the effect 
size. Correlations with one dichotomous variable return the point-biserial correlation 
coefficient , which can be transformed into the biserial correlation coefficient  
by multiplying  by a correction factor (Hunter and Schmidt 2004, p. 210; Bortz and 
Döring 2006, p. 677): 
Δ =  =  ⋅ √
⋅
⋅
   
 =  Φ 

 .  
The variables  and  represent the sample sizes;  is the total sample size, and  
(upsilon) is the probability density over the -value of the standard normal distribution, 
which determines the threshold between the two regions  = 

  and  = 

 . 
3.3.3 Partial correlation 
Correlations between two variables X and Y may be caused, to a certain degree, by 
common correlations with a third variable. Such spurious correlations can be controlled 
by partialing out the influence of the third variable. One disadvantage is the loss of 
context information (Bortz and Döring, p. 621). To decide which correlations should be 
used, the research objective must be consulted. If the research examines the simple 
relationship between two variables, bivariate (also simple or zero order) correlation 
coefficients should be used. However, if the research primarily aims to examine the 
direct influence of one variable on another ceteris paribus, it is more interesting to 
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partial out other influences and use the partial correlations instead (Greene 2000, p. 
233; Amato and Gilbreth 1999, p. 563; Djankov and Murrell 2002, p. 752). Therefore, 
the partial correlation 
. =   !⋅ !"# !$ %⋅# !$ % (Rinne 2008, p. 91) 
is the preferred effect size measure for the study. 3 represents the variable that must be 
eliminated (partialed out) in each iteration. Additionally, this study reports the simple 
correlations to allow the simple relationship to be identified. 
Several studies (Miller and Friesen 1983; Keck 1997) that have attempted to calcu-
late partial correlations have been unsuccessful or have resulted in non-valid numbers. 
In these cases, the reported correlation matrices did not fulfill the mathematical re-
quirement of positive semidefiniteness (Rinne 2008, p. 88). To obtain a valid correla-
tion matrix, variables must be removed and therefore cannot be partialed out. The vari-
ables chosen for removal must have the lowest possible correlation with the design 
parameters or performance criteria. 
Some studies have used more than one measure for a specific interaction as either a 
dependent or independent variable. In such cases, correlations among these measures 
are not partialed out; otherwise, the combined effect using Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) 
method would be biased downwards. The following sections present methods to trans-
form effect sizes other than correlations into a measure ∆ comparable with product-
moment correlations. 
3.3.4 Other correlation coefficients 
The rank correlation coefficient Spearman’s 4 can be transformed with 
Δ = 56 ⋅ 2 arcsin  ;<   
in a measure equivalent to a product-moment correlation (Kraemer and Thiemann 1987; 
Gilpin 1993, pp. 87). The alternative Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient = is trans-
formed into a comparable effect size using  
Δ = sin <> =  
(Rupinski and Dunlap 1996, p. 420; Gilpin 1993, pp. 87). For a fourfold table with two 
dichotomous variables, a transformation is possible with  
Δ = ?@? = cos BC°E"FGHI . 
(Bortz and Döring 2005, p. 230). In the more general case of a JxK contingency table, a 
transformation is possible if a chi-square test has been performed using Cramer’s V: 
Δ = JK = " L$M(NOP(Q;S))   
as the effect size (Hager 2004, p. 487). 
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3.3.5 T-Value, U-value, significance level V 
If a study contains an W-value for an analysis of variance with only two groups, then 
this W-value can be transformed with 
X = √W   
into a X-value (Lipsey and Wilson 2001, p. 199). A X-value can also be obtained from a 
reported significance level using the distribution of X, with YZ as the degrees of free-
dom, usually YZ =  − 2 (Lipsey and Wilson, p. 199): 
X = X(, YZ).   
Rosenthal and Rubin (2003, p. 492) recommend calculating an effect size from p when 
sample sizes are very small. The X-value obtained in this way can then be transformed 
with 
Δ =  = ?\?$E]^   
into a meta-analytic useful effect size (Rosenthal 1984, p .25; Bortz and Döring, 2006). 
3.3.6 Mean based effect sizes 
The probably most intuitive measure for an effect size is the difference between two 
means. The influence of different scales can be eliminated using standardization with 
the pooled standard deviation instead of a simple standard deviation (Kraemer and 
Thiemann 1987, p. 42; Lipsey and Wilson 2001, p .198): 
δ = ``abbc  with ghhi = "(
)$ E(
)$
E
<  . 
The effect obtained in this way can be further transformed into a measure comparable 
to the product-moment correlation (Kraemer and Thiemann 1987, p. 42): 
Δ = j
kj$E l$ll
 . 
3.4 Analysis of homogeneity and combining the effect sizes 
Before the effect sizes can be combined, it is recommended that the negatively or posi-
tively skewed product-moment correlations are transformed into a normally distributed 
variable. This transformation is also recommended when multiple performance 
measures within one study are to be combined. Fisher’s m-transformation (Hedges and 
Olkin 2002, pp. 227; Schulze 2004, pp. 20; Bortz and Döring 2006, p. 218) is used for 
the transformation: 
m = < ln Eoo = artanh Δ. 
The transformation back to the product-moment correlation after aggregating the effects 
is performed by 
 = @$p@$pE = tanh Z. 
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The results may be of limited use if moderating influences exist. To test for moderating 
influences, it is possible to test the homogeneity of a combined effect (Shadish and 
Haddock 1994): 
r = ∑ (tuv`)$wuxy   
with 
m̅ = ∑ {u⋅tu|u}~∑ {u|u}~    = wu   = (
u5). 
The test statistic r is <-distributed. If the null hypothesis that the variance of the sin-
gle effect size does not deviate from a random sample, variance cannot be rejected, m̅ is 
an acceptable estimate for the true effect (Bortz and Döring 2006, p. 681). 
In this study, all effects were first combined under a fixed model, as noted previ-
ously (Hedges and Olkin 2002; for other methods, see Rosenthal and Rubin 1982; 
Hunter and Schmidt 2004). However, if the homogeneity test returns a significant re-
sult, the assumption of one constant population effect must be rejected, and a random 
effects model must be used (Fricke and Treinies 1985; Rustenbach, 2003). The calcula-
tion of confidence intervals is possible for both the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model. If the confidence intervals do not include zero, then the combined effect 
is significantly different from zero. Additionally, it is possible to explain the heteroge-
neity using extreme value-analysis ( > 5) or moderator analysis ( > 15) (Rustenbach 
2003). 
4 Effects of design parameters in empirical studies 
Using the transformations above, comparable effect sizes for the following relationships 
were derived. The analyzed relationships between the design parameters of strategic 
planning and organizational performance are presented and discussed in Figure 1. Table 
3 provides an overview of the symbols used. 
Table 3 Symbols used in effect size tables 
 
Symbol Meaning/Effect size of primary study Symbol Meaning/Effect size of primary study 
r Correlation coefficient 2χ
 
Chi-square value 
r
.U Partial correlation coefficient d Standardized mean difference 
ρ Spearman's rank correlation coefficient p Effect significance level 
τ Kendall‘s tau ∆ Effect size (partial correlation) 
rtet Tetrachoric correlation coefficient ∆r Effect size (simple correlation) 
F F-value N Sample size 
t t-value M Effect size measure of primary study 
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4.1 Organizational properties 
4.1.1 Planning location 
The first design parameter addresses the question of the centralization of the strategic 
planning process. According to Schwenk (1984), potential disadvantages of centraliza-
tion include a limited search for alternatives due to time pressure, set routines and cost 
budgets. Cognitive biases may cause decision makers to defend specific solutions as the 
only possible solution. Even when more than one solution is found, the selection may 
be biased due to overly optimistic or pessimistic assumptions. Transferring the strategic 
planning process to the strategic business units and thus decentralizing the process has 
the potential to reduce the environmental complexity, which, in turn, exerts positive 
effects on the strategic planning process. The effect presents more strongly in turbulent 
environments. 
Other authors argue that centralization may be desirable to minimize political con-
flicts or to prevent unwanted strategy disclosures from threatening the loss of competi-
tive advantages (Wooldridge and Floyd 1990, p. 239). Centralization is also said to 
positively influence organizational performance by enhancing functional integration 
and long-term coordination (Andersen 2000, p. 184). Kranz (2007) suggests additional 
advantages of centralization, such as the realization of diversification advantages, the 
avoidance of planning redundancies and better integration with budgeting and resource 
allocation. 
Although many studies have examined the centralization of strategic planning (e.g., 
Noy and Ellis 2003; Schäffer and Willauer 2003; Parnell 2005), relatively few studies 
have related centralization to organizational performance. The early studies of Gupta 
(1987) and Golden (1992) examine strategic business units. Gupta (1987) finds a posi-
tive effect of decentralization, whereas Golden (1992) finds a negative relationship. 
Although Golden (1992) allows the effect of the strategy content to be partialed out, 
this is not possible for Gupta’s (1987) study, which did not measure strategy content. 
Thus, Gupta (1987) is excluded from the meta-analysis. Both studies measured perfor-
mance with subjective scales. 
 
Table 4 Empirical studies on the relationship between planning location / decentralization and organizational 
performance 
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Study   Interaction with organizational performance  ∆ ∆r M N 
Miller (1987)  TMT Successful firms’ planning is less central-
ized  
0.18* 0.31* 
ur.  88 
Wooldridge and 
Floyd (1990) 
MM Significant positive effect for alternatives 
generated by middle management 
0.28 0.28 r 157 
Floyd and 
Wooldridge 
(1992) 
MM Overall slightly negative effect depending 
on basic strategic orientation 
-0.03 -0.02 
ur.
 
259 
Golden (1992)  TMT Negative effect when planning delegated to 
strategic business unit 
-0.18 0.05 
ur.  384 
Floyd and 
Wooldridge 
(1997) 
MM Overall slightly negative effect; positive 
effect for top-to-bottom influence 
-0.04 -0.03 
ur.
 
259 
Papadakis (1998)  TMT Non-significant positive effect of decen-
tralization 
0.05 0.15 
ur.  70 
Andersen (2000)  TMT Positive effect for decentralized strategic 
decisions 
0.09* 0.14* 
ur.  230 
Baum and 
Wally (2003)  
TMT Positive effect for decentralized strategic 
planning 
-0.09* 0.41 
ur.  318 
Andersen (2004a)  TMT Positive effect for decentralized strategic 
decisions 
0.15* 0.23* 
ur.  112 
Andersen (2004b) TMT Positive effect for decentralized strategic 
decisions 
0.15* 0.18* 
ur.
 
185 
Andersen and 
Nielsen (2009) 
TMT Positive effect for decentralized strategic 
decisions 
0.07 0.12 
ur.
 
185 
Boone and Hen-
driks (2009) 
TMT Decentralization of decision making nega-
tive, particularly when strong locus-of-
control diversity 
-0.18* -0.31* 
ur.
 
33 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 MM = Middle Management; TMT = Top Management Team 
 
Papadakis (1998) confirms the findings of Gupta (1987). For short-term performance 
measures, in particular, he confirms a strong positive relationship between decentral-
ized strategic planning and organizational performance. Andersen’s (2000, 2004a, 
2004b) studies are the first to emphasize that a combination of formal strategic planning 
and emergent planning may positively influence organizational performance. He com-
pares rational central strategic planning with decentralized planning and finds that in all 
three studied industries, the potential for decentralized decisions is positively related to 
organizational performance (Andersen 2000, p. 194). In a follow-up study, he shows 
that decentralization may be industry dependent and justifies his findings by the turbu-
lence of the environment (Andersen 2004a, Andersen 2004b, Andersen and Nielsen 
2009). 
The results of Miller (1987) and Baum and Wally (2003) appear mixed. Whereas the 
former finds a significant positive relationship between decentralization and organiza-
tional performance, Baum and Wally (2003) find a positive effect of centralized strate-
gic planning. They find that centralization enables rapid decisions, and they argue for 
decentralized operative planning only. For top management teams (TMTs) with high 
locus-of-control diversity, Boone and Hendriks (2009) show the advantages of central-
ized decision making. The locus of control refers to the extent to which people believe 
that they are in control of the events that affect them. However, even when the locus of 
control-effect is partialed out, a negative relationship is apparent between decentraliza-
tion and organizational performance. 
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A strong significant and relevant contribution to organizational performance can be 
found in the delegation of decision making to middle management (Wooldridge and 
Floyd 1990). Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992) examination of the implementation phase 
of strategic planning also investigates the participation of middle management. Alt-
hough the effect they identify is slightly negative, they note that the entrepreneurial 
orientation may influence this relationship. The similarly negative trend in Floyd and 
Wooldridge (1997) becomes positive when middle management is enabled to influence 
the lower levels of the hierarchy and is limited from influencing higher levels of the 
hierarchy.  
For the calculation of a combined effect of all twelve primary studies, one study 
(Wooldridge and Floyd 1990) must be excluded because partial correlations cannot be 
calculated. The homogeneity test of the combined effect in the fixed effects model 
returns a significant Q value (α=5%) of r = 38.91	&rcrit = 19.682. Thus, it is not valid 
to assume a homogenous estimate of one effect size. Under a random effects model at 
an error probability of α=5%, the confidence interval for the combined effect with 
−0.04 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.12 includes zero. Considering the zero-order correlations, the 
homogeneity test with r = 63.06 is also significant, which calls for a random effects 
model to combine the effect sizes. The random effects model returns a confidence 
interval for the simple correlations of 0.06 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.22. Therefore, it may be concluded 
that even though a significant, positive, combined zero-order effect of 0.14 can be 
observed with decentralized strategic planning, the high number of studies analyzing 
partial correlations (eleven studies) allows us to conclude that this effect is only slightly 
caused by pure decentralization. Other variables moderate the relationship. These re-
sults reveal the need for further research, particularly regarding the influence of envi-
ronmental uncertainty and the role of middle management. 
4.1.2 Involved planners (Functional diversification) 
Most studies of the functional diversification of planning teams, sometimes called the 
heterogeneity of the planning team, implicitly assume that strategic planning is con-
ducted by the top management team. The research object of these studies is the diver-
sity of functions within the top management team (Papadakis 1995, 1998; Talaulicar et 
al. 2005). 
Another stream of research studies the participation of different planners outside the 
top management team. Kaissi and Begun (2008) assume that the agency costs of the 
principal-agent relation between the board and the top management team are lower 
when the board is also included in the planning process. Different functional areas also 
claim participation. A consideration of the comprehensive accounting literature makes 
the inclusion of the managerial accounting function intuitive (Langfield-Smith 2008). 
The inclusion of marketing in strategic planning is also understandable because mar-
keting is an important environmental information deliverer (Pavia 1991; Morgan et al. 
2000). However, marketing is included in the planning team in less than 50% of plan-
ning companies (Nath and Mahajan 2008). 
Some empirical studies have examined the integration of different functional areas 
or external persons outside the TMT (Table 5a). In the context of strategic planning, 
Robinson Jr. (1982) analyzes the contribution of external consultants to organizational 
performance in small companies and finds a positive influence on sales volume, profit 
and return on sales, with the greatest benefit to profit and sales volume. 
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Within a particular company, strategic planning may be conducted by a planning de-
partment or delegated to the CEO or the TMT. Goldstein and Ward’s (2004) survey of 
75 hospitals finds that the integration of leading specialists positively influences organi-
zational performance. These results hint at the potential for further research on organi-
zations in specialized industries, such as consulting or capital goods, to study the inte-
gration of senior project managers or development engineers. Positive effects of in-
cluding marketing in strategic planning are found by Morgan et al. (2000) and 
Weinzimmer et al. (2003). The latter emphasize that including marketing in planning 
explains more variance than does the functional diversification of the top management 
team. 
 
Table 5a Empirical studies on the relationship between involved planners (other involved planners) and 
organizational performance 
 
Study Relationship with organizational performance Δ Δr
 
M N 
Robinson Jr.  
(1982)  
External consultants exercise positive influence in 
small companies  
0.16* 0.16* d 202 
Morgan 
et al. (2000)  
Inclusion of marketing department into planning 
has positive effects 
0.32* 0.32* d 133 
Weinzimmer 
et al. (2003)  
Inclusion of marketing department into planning 
exhibits a more positive effect than simple func-
tional diversification 
0.11 0.13 
ur.  173 
Goldstein and 
Ward (2004)  
Inclusion of leading specialists is positive 0.32* 0.32 F  70 
Cadez and 
Guilding (2008)  
Inclusion of strategic management accountants 
tends to be negative  
-0.02* 0.29* 
ur.  193 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 
The path analysis by Cadez and Guilding (2008) offers another interesting perspec-
tive on the relationship between certain functional groups. The authors analyze the 
influence of strategic controllers on planning, and they construct the intensity of strate-
gic management accounting as a causal mediator. Thus, the direct path to organizational 
performance is interrupted, and a direct influence of the inclusion of strategic manage-
ment accountants cannot be identified. The partial correlation shows a slightly negative 
influence. 
Due to the large heterogeneity of the studies on the involvement of other functional 
areas or external consultants (Table 5a), it is not useful to combine the single effect 
sizes. 
Interesting results regarding the functional diversification of the top management 
team can be found in Papadakis et al. (1998). Overall, they find a positive effect on 
organizational performance of the highest possible functional diversification. It is inter-
esting that the main effect can be differentiated into a rather high effect for subjective 
performance criteria and a rather weak effect for all objective performance criteria. 
Bantel (1993) mainly studies the relationship between functional diversification and the 
formality of strategic planning, and she finds a positive relationship between functional 
diversification and organizational performance. It is even more interesting that the ef-
fect size does not change considerably when all other influences are partialed out. 
 
Table 5b Empirical studies on the relationship between involved planners (functional diversification of 
planning team) and organizational performance 
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Study Relationship with organizational performance Δ Δr M N 
Bantel (1993) Positive relationship with organizational perfor-
mance 
0.26* 0.26* 
ur.  157 
Simons (1995) Negative relationship assumed to be caused by a 
lack of debate culture 
-0.22 -0.24 
ur.  57 
Keck (1997)  Effect depends on environment      
 • stable environment  -0.05 -0.05 
ur.  56 
 • dynamic environment  -0.01 -0.02 
ur.  18 
 • highly dynamic environment  0.05 0.07 
ur.  18 
Papadakis 
et al. (1998)  
Functional diversification of involved planners 
exhibits positive influence on organizational per-
formance  
0.10* 0.23* 
ur.   70 
Weinzimmer et 
al. (2003) 
Positive effect of functional diversification en-
hanced when marketing is included 
0.12 0.14 
ur.
 
173 
Goll et al. (2008)  Non-significant positive effect on functional diver-
sification  
0.24 0.12 
ur.  174 
Boone and Hen-
driks (2009) 
Effect of functional diversification even more useful 
when TMT enhances internal communication  
0.52* 0.38* 
ur.
 
33 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 
Goll et al. (2008) identify considerably stronger effects. Although the correlation 
between functional diversification and the performance criteria in their study is non-
significant, the effect becomes larger after all other variables are partialed out. This 
finding points to the contrary effects of other influence factors. A possible explanation 
is given by Keck (1997), who shows that the relationship between functional diversifi-
cation in the top management team and performance depends heavily upon the environ-
mental dynamics. Another moderator is identified by Boone and Hendriks (2009) in the 
internal communication of the TMT. The strong positive influence of functional diver-
sification can be further enhanced when information sharing is improved among the top 
managers. Simons (1995) argues that the negative relationship he identifies is caused by 
the lack of debate in the TMT. 
In summary, it can be seen that the functional diversification of the planning team is 
the subject of nine studies, all of which analyze partial correlations. Under a fixed ef-
fects model, the homogeneity test for the combined effect reveals a significant (α=5%) 
r = 19.47	&rcrit = 15.512, which does not allow us to assume homogeneity. Under a 
random effects model, the confidence interval for the combined effect at a significance 
level of α=5% is 0.004 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.25, which is slightly significantly different from zero. 
This means that after controlling for the third variables, the combined effect size is 
0.13. Considering only simple correlations, a fixed effects model with r = 15.27 is 
sharply ( ≤ 0.054) non-significant. The confidence interval for the combined effect 
with  = 0.06 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.21 does not include zero, which allows us to conclude that 
an effect size of ∆`=0.14 may be assumed for an error level of α =5%. Thus, increasing 
functional diversification in the TMT has a significant direct and positive influence on 
organizational performance. 
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4.2 Strategists’ properties 
4.2.1 Teamwork 
Some studies have focused on the consensus or dissent of the strategic planning team, 
often distinguishing between consensus on goals and consensus on means. Bourgeois 
III (1980) notes that consensus or dissent in the TMT is linked to the different process 
models of strategic planning. Under the assumption of a rational process model, one 
could expect a certain degree of consensus in the planning team. In contrast, an emer-
gent model with several small, incremental steps, as proposed by Quinn (1978), sug-
gests a strategic process with diverging goals among the involved planners within the 
organization. 
Grinyer and Norburn (1975) find only a weak, non-significant, positive correlation 
between consensus on goals and organizational performance. However, the size of the 
effect becomes stronger when the pursued organizational goals rather than the desired 
goals of some TMT members are considered. These authors find a much stronger but 
non-significant effect for consensus on the information processes used in strategic plan-
ning, in which information processes can be seen as means. Bourgeois III (1980) is one 
of the first to study these effects and concludes that consensus among top management 
on goals in addition to consensus on means positively influences firm value.  
 
Table 6a Empirical studies on the relationship between the design of teamwork (consensus on goals) and 
organizational performance 
Study  Relationship with organizational performance ∆ ∆r M N 
Grinyer and 
Norburn (1975) 
Positive effect for consensus on pursued goals 0.04 0.04 ρ 21 
Bourgeois III  
(1980)  
Positive effect for consensus on goals 0.51* 0.51* F 12 
Dess (1987)  Positive effect for consensus on goals 0.30 0.30 
ur.  19 
Simons (1995) Dissent only positive for firm value when accom-
panied by open debate 
-0.01 -0.02 
ur.
 
57 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 
Dess (1987) also finds positive effects for team consensus. However, he finds simple 
effects and does not identify an interaction effect between consensus on goals and con-
sensus on means or dissent on goals and dissent on means. It is furthermore interesting 
to note that when combining performance measures, a positive influence can be found 
for the subjective performance measures for both consensus on goals and consensus on 
means, whereas the use of only objective performance measures reveals a positive 
influence for consensus on goals on organizational performance. Simons (1995) finds a 
positive influence of environmental perception on dissent, but the effect persists only 
when it is accompanied by open debate. Without considering this moderator, dissent 
shows a slightly negative relationship with sales growth, although it continues to show 
a slightly positive effect for all performance criteria combined. A slightly positive effect 
for dissent means a slightly negative effect for consensus. Lin, Fu and Liu (2009) study 
task conflicts and relationship conflicts in TMT. The effect they identify is related to 
the task conflict, but the authors note that in China, it is difficult to distinguish task 
conflicts from relationship conflicts. Furthermore, although other variables that corre-
late with organizational performance can be partialed out from task conflict, the result-
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ing partial correlation is not very different from the zero-order correlation. This may be 
because task conflict directly influences organizational performance. 
Ramos-Garza (2009) finds evidence for a moderating influence of the industry and 
suggests that it is advisable to strive for consensus on means in a complex environment, 
and it is more advisable to foster debate and dissent in less complex environments. 
Overall, however, Ramos-Garza (2009) finds a negative relationship between consensus 
on strategy and organizational performance. 
 
Table 6b Empirical studies on the relationship between the design of teamwork (consensus on means) and 
organizational performance  
 
Study  Relationship with organizational performance ∆ ∆r M N 
Grinyer and 
Norburn (1975) 
Consensus on information process to use in strategy 
making 
0.27 0.27 ρ 21 
Bourgeois III  
(1980)  
Consensus on means   0.49* 0.49* F 14 
Dess (1987)  Consensus on means   0.14 0.16 
ur.  19 
Simons (1995) Dissent only positive if accompanied by open 
debate 
-0.01 -0.02 
ur.
 
57 
Liu, Fu and Liu 
(2009) 
Task-related conflicts in TMT have negative effect 0.28* 0.27* 
ur.
 
123 
Ramos-
Garza (2009)  
Negative relationship -0.08 -0.08 
ur.  29 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 
As has been shown, it is possible and necessary to distinguish between consensus on 
goals and consensus on means. For consensus on goals, a homogenous effect size can-
not be assumed with partial correlations (r = 3.40, rcrit = 7.81, ∆`= 0.10) or simple 
correlations (r = 3.42, rcrit = 7.81, ∆`= 0.10). The combined effect under a random 
effects model would be ∆`= 0.12. However, the confidence interval ( =
−0.10 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.34 identical for both types of correlation) includes zero, which does 
not allow us to identify a relationship between consensus on goals in TMT and organi-
zational performance.  
In contrast, for consensus on means, both the effect of partial correlations (r = 3.92, 
rcrit = 9.49, ∆`= 0.23) and the combined effect of simple correlations (r = 3.71, 
rcrit = 9.49, ∆`= 0.23) allow the assumption of a homogenous effect size. The confi-
dence interval  = 0.09 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.37 for the partial correlations and the confidence 
interval  = 0.08 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.37 for the simple correlations show that the combined 
effect is significant. 
4.2.2 Risk-taking propensity of TMT 
A frequently studied property of strategic planners is risk-taking behavior. The attitude 
toward risk indicates whether an individual is willing to take risks or is risk averse. The 
risk-taking propensity is a property of strategists, suggesting that it may exhibit a 
stronger effect on strategy selection (Papadakis et al. 1998). Fiegenbaum (1997) links 
risk taking to organizational strategy formulation using the prospect theory of Kahne-
man and Tversky (1997). 
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Table 7 Empirical studies on the relationship between risk taking and organizational performance  
 
Study  Relationship with organizational performance ∆ ∆r M N 
Singh (1986)  Lower organizational performance is related to risk 
taking 
-0.19 -0.20 
ur.  64 
Simsek (2007)  Lower organizational performance in previous 
period leads to risk taking 
-0.23 -0.02 
ur.  495 
Miller (1987)  Risk taking associated with better organizational 
performance 
0.04* 0.20* 
ur.   88 
Covin and Slevin 
(1998) 
Risk taking leads to better performance only in less 
technologically challenging environments; other-
wise, negative relationship 
-0.09 0.05 
ur.
 
330 
Gilley et al. 
(2002) 
Risk taking in relation to proactive introduction of 
new products and processes is positive 
0.08* 0.31* 
ur.
 
94 
Simsek (2007)  Risk taking positively associated with current 
performance  
0.37* 0.43* 
ur.  495 
Subramanian et al. 
(2009) 
Slightly negative effect; small positive effect only in 
high competition environments  
-0.03 -0.04 
ur.
 
166 
 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
Some studies have examined the direct relationship between the risk-taking behavior 
of TMT members and organizational performance. Singh (1986) finds a negative rela-
tionship. According to his study, and consistent with prospect theory, low organiza-
tional performance increases risk-taking behavior, whereas TMTs in high-performing 
companies exhibit risk-averse behavior. Singh (1986) believes that organizational slack 
(Bourgeois III 1981) moderates the relationship. Organizational slack may be under-
stood as the cushion of resources that allows additional projects. Higher slack goes 
hand in hand with higher risk taking (Singh 1986). In contrast, Miller (1987) finds evi-
dence for better performance in risk-taking companies. However, Miller’s (1987) re-
sults are non-significant (a significance of p<0.13 can be calculated from his data) and 
measured by subjective indicators. A potential explanation can be found in an earlier 
study by Miller and Friesen (1983),2 which suggests that an effect of risk taking on 
organizational performance may be identified only in dynamic and complex environ-
ments. Subramanian et al. (2009) also find a small positive effect in high-competition 
environments. Overall, however, they derive a small, non-significant negative effect for 
risk-taking TMTs. Similarly, Covin and Slevin (1998) do not identify a positive contri-
bution of risk taking to organizational performance; partialing out all other variables 
results in a negative relationship. However, they show a positive relationship between 
risk taking and organizational performance in less technologically challenging envi-
ronments, which contradicts Miller and Friesen (1983). Gilley et al. (2002) find a posi-
tive effect of risk taking on the proactive introduction of new products and processes. 
The opposite effect is produced in a dynamic environment. Simsek (2007) finds that a 
higher willingness to take risks results in higher organizational performance, especially 
with long-tenured CEOs. 
Studies on the relationship between the risk-taking attitudes of the members of stra-
tegic planning teams and performance criteria also confirm the prospect theory of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). It is possible to distinguish two groups of studies. On 
                                                          
2
  Miller and Friesen (1983) published only the correlations between the independent variables for their 
successful and unsuccessful samples. They do not elaborate on the relationship between independent 
variables and the performance criteria, so an effect size cannot be determined. Therefore, the study is not 
included in Table 7. 
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the one hand, the studies of Simsek (2007) and Singh (1986) show that low organiza-
tional performance induces more risk taking. The calculation of a combined effect for 
these two studies with highly varying sample sizes does not appear useful. 
On the other hand, the studies shown in Table 7 present evidence that, in three stud-
ies, a statistically significantly higher risk-taking propensity is related to higher organi-
zational performance, thus confirming the assumed return on increasing risk taking 
when organizational performance is low. The homogeneity of the combined effect must 
be denied for partial correlations (r = 54.18, rcrit = 9.49, ∆`= 0.14) and for simple 
correlations (r = 49.06, ∆`= 0.24). The confidence intervals in the consequently re-
quired random effects model include zero both for the combination of partial correla-
tions ( = −0.15 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.31) and of simple correlations ( = −0.03 ≤ ∆`≤
0.42); therefore, we cannot assume a relationship between risk taking in strategic plan-
ning and organizational performance. 
4.3 Planning method properties 
The design parameters of formalization, rationalization and intensity presume a planned 
approach, as proposed by the prescriptive conceptions of the strategic planning process. 
Studies that ask “Does strategic planning pay?” imply that companies require a rational, 
formal planning process to identify their strategy. In addition to this assumption, these 
primary studies automatically operationalize the strategic planning constructs of “for-
malization” and “intensity”. Emergent planning conceptions that assume that strategies 
may emerge out of the environment or the business without being deliberately planned 
are suppressed. Additionally, companies may act without either a formal strategic plan 
or an emergent strategy. 
Although formalization and intensity are among the most frequently studied research 
subjects, a common understanding of these constructs is lacking. Quite often, the strate-
gic planning concepts of “rationality” and “intensity” are used simultaneously and syn-
onymously. Rational actions are understood as “orderly, clear and purposeful” (Lyles 
1987, p. 267) or “behavior that is calculated or instrumental” (Dean and Sharfman 
1993, p. 1070). In a rational strategic planning process, the individual steps necessary to 
solve the problem are described (Lindblom 1959; Fredrickson 1983). To solve the 
problems, operations research, decision theory or strategic management accounting 
methods are applied more or less intensively (Lindblom 1959, p. 80; Baum et al. 2007, 
pp. 5). Researchers generally presume a rational process when measuring the intensity 
of strategic planning. Thus, the rationality and intensity of planning are often subsumed 
under synoptic planning (Frederickson 1983; Kranz 2007). However, observations 
abstracted to that level may be the reason for contradictory research results. Fredrickson 
(1983) notes that companies may establish a rational planning process (a planning pro-
cess consisting of single, distinguishable steps), but they may not utilize the process 
with the desired intensity due to cost limitations (Fredrickson 1983, p. 569). For a sin-
gle individual, this phenomenon is known as bounded rationality. Personal goals and 
motives may influence the decision-making process which may be discontinued as soon 
as a satisfying alternative has been found (Fleming 1966, p. 52; Cyert and March 1963; 
Simon 1948). 
Therefore, it is useful to distinguish between rationality and intensity to allow a bet-
ter structuration. Rationality describes the existence of a structured strategic planning 
process. Rationality, in this respect, should not be understood as a single measure that 
may be optimized using operations research. It is easy to imagine quite complex struc-
tured planning processes, which are unlikely to be described as a clear, orderly se-
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quence of steps. Intensity is the depth of the process in the single steps, such as the 
number of tools used to support a decision. A similar distinction is made by Weißen-
berger and Löhr (2007) for planning in general. 
This rational or synoptic process in research is often called “formal strategic plan-
ning”, which should be distinguished from formalization in the narrower sense. For-
malization is the extent to which formal guidelines and documents, decision criteria or 
the organization of the planning in formal rather than informal meetings support the 
strategic planning process (Cray et al. 1988; Tochtermann 1990; Papadakis et al. 1998; 
Szypersky and Müller-Böling 1980). 
Superficially, it initially appears that there is little reason to postulate a relationship 
between the formalization of the planning process and organizational performance. 
However, Papadakis (1995) presents evidence of a relationship between formalization 
and rational planning, although he does not provide suggestions regarding the causality 
of the interaction. To a certain degree, decision makers trust in their own basic assump-
tions. Such a high level of self-confidence, however, may lead to neglect the need for 
formal, written plans (Schwenk 1984, p. 121). Thus, the existence of formal plans may 
challenge the fundamental assumptions of the strategic planning process insofar as they 
are not only an exercise and are used to improve planning, resulting in higher organiza-
tional performance. 
In contrast to a formal, rational strategic planning process of varying intensity, 
Mintzberg (1978) describes an emergent process of strategy formulation. These emer-
gent processes exhibit some anomalies that require additional attention. Emergent strat-
egies consist of an unconscious pattern of decisions (Mintzberg 1978, p. 947) or actions 
(Mintzberg and Waters 1985, p. 285), which is often only recognized in hindsight. Once 
recognized, these patterns are developed into a deliberate strategy. Mintzberg (1978) 
does not identify the location (central or decentral) of the genesis of the emergent strat-
egy. 
Bower (1970) notes that decentrality is an important facet of emergent strategies. 
New project ideas are often addressed to middle-level managers, who subsequently 
support these ideas. Quinn (1978) sees strategic planning as a developing process that 
may be consciously administered. However, he suggests that the planning and imple-
mentation of that process occurs in rather small, incremental steps. The practical im-
plementation may be unknown until an opportunity for implementation is perceived. 
Therefore, emerging processes are either not consciously perceived and subsequently 
formulated deliberately after the pattern is recognized, or they are acknowledged but do 
not take the form of planned, distinguishable, rational steps. Thus, emerging strategy 
processes contrast with the previously discussed constructs of “formalization”, “ration-
ality” and “intensity”, whereas emergence is understood as the opposite pole of a ra-
tional strategic planning process.  
In empirical studies, the distinction between the constructs of “formalization”, “ra-
tionality (vs. emergence)” and “intensity” is often not clearly visible. In early studies, 
the primary research interest was the existence of strategic planning as such, whereas 
newer and more complex studies have focused on single aspects, such as rationality vs. 
emergence or the intensity of strategic planning. For the remainder of this section, and 
following Figure 2, the influence of formal planning (the “formalization” construct) on 
organizational performance is reviewed, followed by the effects of rational vs. emer-
gence strategies (the “rationality” construct). Finally, the relationships between differ-
ent intensities of strategic planning (the “intensity” construct) and organizational per-
formance are examined. 
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of the strategic planning constructs “formalization”, “rationality” and “intensity” 
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4.3.1 Formalization of strategic planning 
The performance effect of strategic planning has been the subject of several literature 
reviews and meta-analyses. The primary studies in these reviews will be reviewed in 
this paper to derive effect sizes for a combined effect. A brief overview of the existing 
reviews is provided in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 Literature reviews on performance effects of formal strategic planning 
 
Study  Relationship with organizational performance 
Armstrong (1982)  5 out of 15 studies show significant positive contribution 
Shrader et al. (1984)  Positive contribution possible depending on contingency factors ( 31 studies) 
Greenley (1986)  No clear relationship detectable (9 studies) 
Pearce II et al. (1987)  Positive relationship in 10 out of 21 studies, one negative relationship 
Boyd (1991)  Significant positive relationship for return on capital in 9 out of 21 studies 
Schwenk and 
Shrader (1993)  
Significant positive relationship for small companies (15 studies) 
 
Miller and Cardinal (1994)  Significant positive relationship with growth, if industry effects are controlled. 
Significant positive relationship with profitability in turbulent environments 
(35 studies) 
 
Some of these studies limit their scope to small companies, which produces some 
specific results. The cut-off criteria for small companies are taken from the primary 
studies. Companies with less than 500 or less than 50 employees are often classified as 
small in these studies. In two cases, the industry was used as a criterion. Robinson and 
Littlejohn (1981) point out that small companies do not understand “long term” the 
same way as larger companies do; rather, they consider a period of one to two years. 
According to their research, strategic planning in small firms focuses on goals for func-
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tional areas instead of more general organizational goals, but it is nevertheless corre-
lated positively with organizational performance. Ackelsberg’s (1985) research on 
small companies also finds that planning firms perform better, but performance de-
creases when plans are administered in written form. In contrast, Bracker and Pearson 
(1986) find that small companies can benefit significantly from formal strategic plan-
ning compared with non-formal planning companies. Furthermore, they find that small 
young firms perform better than older small firms, but this difference vanishes with the 
existence of formal strategic planning. According to Gable and Topol (1987), small and 
medium retail firms benefit little from strategic planning. Similar to Ackelsberg’s 
(1985) findings, few written plans exist. 
Cragg and King (1988) conclude that written plans in small metal processing firms 
negatively influence organizational performance. For real estate companies, however, 
formal planning results in a positive, but non-significant, relationship with organiza-
tional performance. The effect size becomes stronger when it is related only to the sales 
figures (Wood et al. 1988). Similar results are presented by Shrader et al. (1989). For all 
combined performance measures, the effect of strategic planning is only slightly posi-
tive; however, this effect quadruples when profit is removed as a measure. The evi-
dence that strategic planning in small companies fosters growth above all is confirmed 
by the findings of Lyles et al. (1993), who find a significant positive advantage of ex-
plicit strategic planning in small companies for only one of three performance 
measures, sales growth. Unfortunately, their study did not include the effects of non-
significant results, which may result in a biased effect size. McKiernan and Morris 
(1994) also study small and medium companies. All five of their performance measures 
are positively related to an institutionalized strategic planning process. However, they 
find a significant effect only for returns on working capital. 
 
Table 9: Empirical studies on the relationship between planning formalization and organizational perfor-
mance (small companies) 
 
Study  Relationship with organizational performance ∆ ∆r M N 
Robinson and 
Littlejohn (1981) 
Strategic planning for small companies positive; 
however, shorter planning horizons considered 
0.12* 0.12* p 67 
Ackelsberg (1985) For small companies, positive contribution of 
strategic planning if not too strictly formalized 
0.10 0.10 r 135 
Bracker and 
Pearson (1986) 
For small companies, positive contribution of 
formal strategic planning 
0.12 0.12 d 188 
Gable and Topol 
(1987) 
No benefit found for small and medium retail firms  0.05 0.05 t 179 
Cragg and King 
(1988) 
Written business plans exhibit negative influence 
on organizational performance in small metal 
processing firms 
-0.13 -0.13 r 179 
Wood et al. (1988) Formal planning positive for real estate firms 0.13* 0.13* d 126 
Shrader et al. 
(1989) 
Weak positive effect of planning in small firms can 
be quadrupled if profit is not considered as perfor-
mance measure 
0.02 0.02 r 97 
Lyles et al. (1993) Strategic planning fosters sales growth 0.35* 0.35* p 67 
McKiernan and 
Morris (1994) 
Significant positive effect only for return on work-
ing capital in small firms 
0.15 0.15 rtet 66 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 
Different results are found when the samples are not limited to small firms. Ansoff et 
al. (1970) were one of the first to show that strategically planning firms perform sig-
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nificantly better in acquisitions. Thune and House (1970) find a positive contribution of 
strategic planning to organizational performance in a cross-sectional study. However, 
they also note that this positive effect could not be found in the food, oil or steel in-
dustries. Therefore, they are among the first to note the importance of environmental 
factors as moderators. 
 
Table 10: Empirical studies on the relationship between formalization of strategic planning and organiza-
tional performance 
 
Study  Relationship with organizational performance ∆ ∆r M N 
Ansoff et al. 
(1970) 
Positive effect of planning on strategic acquisitions 0.20* 0.20* p 93 
Thune and House 
(1970) 
Positive contribution of planning except in food, oil 
and steel industries 
0.42* 0.42* d 36 
Denning and Lehr 
(1972) 
Non-significant positive contribution; firms intro-
duce planning together with growing technological 
change and capital intensity  
0.06 0.06 d 287 
Herold (1972) Chemical industry benefits from planning 0.66* 0.66* d 10 
Fulmer and Rue 
(1974) 
Overall small negative effect, but strong depend-
ency on industry 
-0.18 -0.18 d 386 
Karger and Malik 
(1975); Malik and 
Karger (1975) 
Non-significant positive effect of formal planning 
on mechanical engineering industry 
0.38 0.38 t 13 
Wood and La-
Forge (1979) 
Significant positive effect of formal planning 
compared to randomized control group and non-
planners 
0.55* 0.55* d 39 
Kudla (1980) Non-significant positive effect for shareholder 
return 
0.05 0.05 2χ
 
129 
Leontiades and 
Tezel (1980) 
Non-significant positive perceptions of strategic 
planning by CEO and CPO 
0.08 0.08 2χ
 
61 
Whitehead and 
Gup (1985) 
Only banks with low performance practice strategic 
planning 
-0.16* -0.16*
 
t 302 
Rhyne (1986) Non-significant positive effect of formal planning 
for 10-year shareholder return 
0.05 0.05 d 89 
Powell (1992) Positive effect for apparel industry, but not for total 
sample 
0.10 0.17 
ur.
 
113 
Bantel (1993) Non-significant negative relationship; significant 
positive relationship with profit variance 
-0.10 -0.13 
ur.
 
80 
Goll and 
Rasheed (1997)  
Non-significant positive relationship in dynamic, 
attractive environment  
0.14 0.14 
ur.
 
62 
Al-Shammari and 
Hussein (2007)  
Positive relationship in growth markets or emerging 
markets 
0.40* 0.40* F 28 
Glaister et al. 
(2008) 
Positive relationship in growth markets or emerging 
markets 
0.28* 0.28* p 135 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 
Although one may argue that the chemical industry, similar to the oil industry and 
the steel industry, is a less complex environment, Herold (1972) shows significant pos-
itive effects of formal strategic planning on organizational performance. Slightly posi-
tive effects are found by most other studies, although most of these results are non-
significant. In addition to a non-significant positive effect, Denning and Lehr (1972) 
find that the introduction of formal strategic planning accompanies technological 
change, capital intensity and organizational size and complexity. In Fulmer and Rue’s 
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(1974) study, durable goods firms benefit from formal strategic planning, whereas 
short-term-oriented consumer goods firms experience negative effects of strategic plan-
ning. For all industries, the effect size is slightly negative. Karger and Malik (1975) 
(same sample as Malik and Karger 1975) also study durable goods firms and use 13 
different measures for organizational performance. Seven of these measures show sig-
nificant benefits for strategic planning. The combination of all criteria for organiza-
tional performance, however, is non-significant. Kudla (1980) investigates whether the 
introduction of strategic planning delivers a positive return for shareholders but finds 
only non-significant positive effects, which are confirmed by Rhyne (1986) using ten-
year total shareholder returns. Leontiades and Tezel (1980) ask whether CEOs or Chief 
Planning Officers (CPOs) perceive a positive contribution of strategic planning to or-
ganizational performance, but they find only a weak, non-significant positive effect. 
Some studies focus on strategic planning in the banking industry. A significant posi-
tive relationship between formal planning and organizational performance is identified 
by Wood and LaForge (1979). They assume that formal planning is not the only reason 
for performance, but performance and formal planning are expressions of a progressive 
leadership style. A negative relationship is found by Whitehead and Gup (1985), who 
assume inverse causality in the banking industry; therefore, only banks with low per-
formance consider it necessary to introduce strategic planning. This argument is sup-
ported by Bantel (1993), who finds a negative relationship. According to these findings, 
formal planning is more strongly required or communicated when banks’ profits are 
liable to strong variances. 
According to Powell (1992), the process and the tools of strategic planning are easily 
imitable, and an advantage is only apparent in markets with a low spread of planning 
methods. In a comparison of the furniture and apparel industries, Powell (1992) finds a 
significant positive effect in the apparel industry, but not in the furniture industry. The 
effects of both industries result in a slightly positive relationship with performance. 
Goll and Rasheed (1997) find positive effects on organizational performance for firms 
in a dynamic and attractive environment. In line with these findings, Al-Shammari and 
Hussein (2007) show that strategic planning yields advantages for companies in 
emerging markets. These results are confirmed by Glaister et al. (2008). 
Due to the close proximity between formalization and rationality vs. emergence of 
strategic planning, the combined effects are presented at the end of the next section. 
4.3.2 Rational vs. emergent strategy processes 
Slevin and Covin’s (1997) comparison of a rational strategic planning process with an 
emergent strategy process does not find significant differences. However, as the authors 
point out, the form of strategy formulation must fit the organizational structure of the 
firm. In organic (i.e., more flexible and less formal) structures of companies, emergent 
strategy generation is significantly positively related to organizational performance, 
whereas in mechanistic organizations, a formal strategic planning process is positively 
related to performance. 
The finding of Covin et al. (2006) that the degree to which strategies emerge in 
companies is an important moderator of the relationship between an entrepreneurial 
orientation and company performance is particularly interesting. 
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Table 11 Empirical studies on the relationship between formal strategic planning vs. emergent planning and 
organizational performance 
 
Study Relationship with organizational performance ∆ ∆r M N 
Slevin and Co-
vin (1997)  
Slight advantage of rational vs. emergent strategy 
genesis  
-0.01 0,01 
ur.  112 
Andersen (2000) Effect of rational process stronger than effect of 
emergent process; both effects positive 
0.29* 0.34* 
ur.
 
230 
Andersen (2004a) Both planning modes positively correlated with 
performance; emergent processes more relevant in 
turbulent environments 
0.36* 0.12 
ur.
 
185 
Andersen (2004b) Both planning modes positively correlated with 
performance; emergent processes more relevant in 
turbulent environments 
0.33* 0.35* 
ur.
 
185 
Covin et al. (2006)  Rational planning less advantageous than emergent 
strategy formulation in entrepreneurial-oriented 
organizations  
-0.10 0.01 
ur.  110 
Andersen and 
Nielsen (2009) 
In general, advantage of rational planning, but 
combination of rational and emergent methods is 
crucial 
0.18* 0.10* 
ur.
 
185 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 
Andersen (2000) compares rational planning processes with emergent strategy gene-
sis. Both planning methods are significantly positively related to organizational perfor-
mance, although the effect for the rational process is much stronger than the effect for 
the emergent process. The effect sizes indicated in Table 11 are calculated from the 
difference between the effect of a rational strategy process and the effect of an emer-
gent strategy process. Andersen (2004a, 2004b) points out that emergent planning gains 
importance in turbulent environments. Andersen and Nielsen (2009) also note that, 
independent of the individual contributions of both types of strategy generation, it is 
crucial to pursue both rational and emergent planning processes simultaneously. 
Of 31 studies on the relationship between formal strategic planning and organiza-
tional performance (Table 9 to 11), only nine studies consider partial correlations. The 
other studies did not publish sufficient data to partial out third variables. For the combi-
nation of all 31 effect sizes, we cannot assume a fixed-effects model for partial correla-
tions3 (r = 139.64, rcrit = 43.77, ∆`= 0.09) or for simple correlations (r = 126.75, 
rcrit = 43.77, ∆`= 0.08). The random-effects model produces a confidence interval 
 = 0.06 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.12 (including partial correlations where possible) or  = 0.09 ≤
∆`≤ 0.16 (all zero order correlations) for the total effect. Therefore, a significantly 
positive effect can be identified for formal strategic planning on organizational perfor-
mance. If only the nine studies that allow the combination of partial correlations are 
considered, an even stronger effect can be found for a random-effects model (r =
34.04, rcrit = 15.51, ∆`= 0.15,  = 0.03 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.27). 
For small firms (Table 9), strategic planning seems to pay off. It is possible to com-
bine the effect sizes under a fixed-effects model because homogeneity cannot be re-
jected (r = 14.83, rcrit = 15.51, ∆`= 0.07). The combined effect is significant, with a 
confidence interval  = 0.01 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.13. When rational planning is directly com-
pared with emergent planning (Table 11), a significant positive advantage of rational 
planning is apparent. It should be noted that most authors of the primary studies suggest 
                                                          
3
   When partial correlations are not available in a primary study, zero-order correlations are used, even in 
the partial correlation combinations. 
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that both planning methods should be used in combination. The advantage of rational 
planning over emergent planning can be calculated as a combined effect and becomes 
positive and significant under a model of random effects with partial correlations 
(r = 12.22, rcrit = 11.07, ∆`= 0.12,  = 0.02 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.22) as well as under a model 
of fixed effects for simple correlations (r = 5.84, rcrit = 11.07, ∆`= 0.13,  =
0.07 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.20). Generally, it should be noted that, in most studies, the moderating 
influence of the environment is obvious: the more the environment is subject to 
changes, the more necessary a formal strategic planning process and supplementary 
emergent strategy generation become. 
4.3.3 Intensity of strategic planning 
Thus far, this study has focused on the existence of a strategic planning process in terms 
of a more or less dichotomous variable. Now, we focus on the intensity of strategic 
planning measured by ordinal or metric scales. Some empirical studies of intensity are 
not included in the reviews presented in Table 8. The results of these studies on the 
intensity of strategic planning reflect the challenges faced by researchers when studying 
the properties of the planning method. No clear results can be identified in the studies 
of Kraus et al. (2006) or O’Regan et al. (2008). O’Regan et al. (2008) limit their study 
to the analysis of the environment, whereas Günther (1991) studies a variety of strategic 
planning tools throughout the planning process chain. He considers the individual risk 
of each firm and concludes that high performance can be achieved for very good plan-
ners, but only at the price of high risk. This conclusion can also be seen in the fact that, 
in his study, excellent planners show relatively little variance in their performance 
figures but a lower level of performance. Günther (1991) notes that the relationship 
between the intensity of strategic planning and organizational performance takes a non-
linear form. Burt (1978) studies the quality of strategic planning in a comparatively 
small sample and finds a strong positive effect of the intensity of strategic planning on 
organizational performance. Studying the banking industry, Wood and LaForge (1979) 
find significant positive effects of intensive strategic planning on organizational per-
formance. Robinson et al.’s (1984) survey of small firms finds that strategic planning 
pays off in every life cycle phase of small companies, but different performance 
measures are affected in each phase. Ackelsberg (1985) also shows a clear positive 
relationship between the analytic intensity of strategic planning and organizational 
performance in small firms. Although Orpen (1985) presents a weak positive effect of 
strategic planning intensity, he concludes that a relationship does not exist due to the 
non-significance of his results. 
The results of Cadez and Guilding (2008) are difficult to interpret. The results of 
their structural equation model do not reflect the partial correlations. Although their 
data fit a structural equation model with a significant path from the intensity of strategic 
management accounting to performance, the partial correlation does not support this 
path, with an effect size of 0.00. The influence of the intensity of strategic management 
accounting may be caused by other relationships that are not included in the model 
(omitted variables). However, the model has a high fit. 
The results of Hopkins and Hopkins (1997) are interesting. They examine single 
planning steps rather than considering the planning process as an entity. Hopkins and 
Hopkins show that intensive strategic planning in the mission development phase, alter-
native evaluation and selection phase, and implementation and monitoring phases cor-
relates strongly and positively with performance criteria, whereas no relationship is 
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apparent for the goal development and analysis phases. A potential problem arises with 
this research design when the implied processes are not implemented in some of the 
surveyed firms. However, it is also interesting that the environment does not signifi-
cantly influence the performance effect of strategic planning. 
 
Table 12 Empirical studies on the relationship intensity of strategic planning and organizational perfor-
mance 
 
Study Relationship with organizational performance ∆ ∆r M N 
Burt (1978) Planning quality positive for organizational per-
formance in large retail chains 
0.55* 0.55* r 14 
Wood and La-
Forge (1979) 
Banks benefit from intensive strategic planning 0.46* 0.46* d 39 
Fredrickson  
(1984)  
Positive relationship in stable environment 
 
0.49* 0.49* 
ur.  38 
Fredrickson and 
Mitchell (1984)  
Negative relationship in dynamic environment -0.35* -0.35* 
ur.  29 
Robinson et al. 
(1984) 
Small firms improve organizational performance 
with intensive strategic planning independent of 
the life cycle phase of the firm 
0.25* 0.25* ρ 51 
Ackelsberg 
(1985) 
Analytic intensity of planning in small firms 
contributes to organizational performance 
0.20* 0.20* r 185 
Orpen (1985) Generally positive relationship 0.13 0.13 r 52 
Günther (1991)  Contingency coefficient significantly positive, but 
very intensive planning firms take higher risk; 
non-linear relationship 
0.29* 0.29* χ2 105 
Priem et al. 
(1995)  
Positive relationship; even stronger in uncertain 
environment 
0.08* 0.24* 
ur.  109 
Hopkins and 
Hopkins (1997)  
Generally non-significant positive relationship for 
banks; relationship depends on planning phase 
0.18* 0.22* 
ur.   112 
Papadakis 
et al. (1998)  
Generally, intensity of planning is non-significant 
but positively correlated (only for RoA significant 
positive); subjective indicators negatively corre-
lated 
0.05 0.15 
ur.  70 
Atuahene-Gima 
and Li (2004)  
Relationship depends upon technological envi-
ronment 
0.01 0.10 
ur.  373 
Kraus 
et al. (2006)  
No clear relationship (weak positive relation) 
 
0.09 0.09 p 290 
Mueller 
et al. (2007)  
Nearly no relationship, but depends upon intended 
planning goal 
-0.01 0.04 
ur.   42 
Cadez and 
Guilding (2008)  
No direct relationship of planning intensity, but 
indirect relationship can be found 
0.00* 0.59* 
ur.  193 
O’Regan 
et al. (2008)  
No clear relationship (weak positive relation) 
 
0.04 0.04 r 170 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
 
Papadakis et al. (1998) find a weak positive correlation. Their assumption of an in-
verse causal relationship is interesting, suggesting that prior organizational performance 
allows companies to implement more intensive planning processes. 
Studies that consider environmental factors as contingency factors may contribute to 
the understanding of these relationships. Fredrickson (1984) and Fredrickson and 
Mitchel (1984) find that in a dynamic environment, an intensive strategic planning 
process negatively affects organizational performance, whereas in a stable environment, 
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intensive planning contributes positively to organizational performance. Both studies 
operationalize environmental dynamism with industry properties such as price or con-
tribution margin variances. The results of Fredrickson (1984) and Fredrickson and 
Mitchel (1984) are impressive due to their high effect sizes, which, according to the 
authors, are partial correlations. 
Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004) show that the relationship between the intensity of 
strategic planning and organizational performance is heavily dependent on the envi-
ronment. Priem et al. (1995) find that in an uncertain environment, more intensive stra-
tegic planning correlates positively with higher organizational performance. Even when 
the environmental influence is partialed out from this result, a positive relationship is 
apparent. Finally, Mueller et al. (2007) do not find a relationship between planning 
intensity and organizational performance. However, when the relationships are distin-
guished by the intended goal of the planning, negative relationships with the perfor-
mance criteria can be found when planning is used persuasively or for monitoring pur-
poses. In contrast, Mueller et al. (2007) find a strong positive relationship when the 
intended planning goal is to satisfy information needs or to serve a symbolic purpose. 
The combined effect of strategic planning intensity on organizational performance 
has been studied in 16 different papers, with eight papers allowing for the analysis of 
partial correlations. Random effects must be assumed for the analysis of partial correla-
tions (r = 33.96, rcrit = 25.00, ∆`= 0.13,  = 0.05 ≤ ∆`≤ 0.21) as well as for the 
analysis of simple correlations (r = 28.68, rcrit = 25.00, ∆`= 0.22,  = 0.14 ≤ ∆`≤
0.30). In both cases, the combined effects are significant at α = 5%. It should be noted 
that some studies point out that the environment should not be neglected as an im-
portant moderator. It seems that in an overly dynamic environment, intensive planning 
results in lower performance. 
4.4 Overview of relationships 
When combining the effects on the basis of partial correlations (Table 13), significant 
effects can be found for the functional diversification of the involved planners as well 
as for all three facets of the planning method. Formal strategic planning, a rational plan-
ning process and an intensive planning process are positively correlated with organiza-
tional performance. Positive significant effects can also be found between consensus on 
means and organizational performance, but the number of studies is too small to for-
mulate a scientifically sound statement, with only two out of five studies allowing the 
analysis of partial correlations. More studies would be desirable and would allow biases 
caused by the design of the primary studies to be avoided or leveled. More studies 
would also facilitate a better analysis of moderating influences, such as the industry or 
environmental dynamics. 
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Table 13 Empirically studied design parameters 
  
 
  
  
Dimension  Parameter  
Ratio of 
studies with 
partial corre-
lations  
Combined 
effect  
Homogeneity 
measure  Q 
(critical level in 
brackets) 
Significance 
of homo-
geneity 
p(Q)  
Combi-
nation 
model  
Organization Planning location 11 out of 12 0,04 38,91 (19,68) No 
Random 
effects 
 
Involved planners 
(Functional 
diversification) 9 out of 9 0,13* 19,47 (15,51) No 
Random 
effects 
Strategists 
Consensus on 
goals 2 out of 4 0,10 3,40 (7,81) Yes 
Fixed 
effects 
 
Consensus on 
means 2 out of 5 0,23* 3,92 (9,49) Yes 
Fixed 
effects 
 Risk taking 5 out of 5 0,08 54,18 (9,49) No 
Random 
effects 
Planning 
method Formalization 9 out of 31 0,15* 34,04 (15,51) No 
Random 
effects 
 
Rationality vs. 
emergence 6 out of 6 0,12* 12,22 (11,07) No 
Random 
effects 
 Intensity 8 out of 16 0,13* 33,96 (25,00) No 
Random 
effects 
* significant at a level of α = 5 % in primary study 
5 Limitations and future research  
Acknowledging the vast number of empirical studies, this review is limited to work that 
relates the design parameters of the strategic planning process to organizational perfor-
mance. Although some results provide clear conclusions, others are more difficult to 
aggregate. Often, we find small effects (Table 13), which are a common phenomenon in 
strategy research (Mazen et al. 1987) due to the “black box” approach of many studies. 
Relationships are identified, but, often, the exact mechanisms are not analyzed. Never-
theless, the low total effects demonstrate the need for future research. If we can observe 
significant effects from small changes in a complex context, it is worthwhile to search 
for the exact cause and effects. By identifying interactions in isolated causalities, we 
may observe stronger effects, and we may be able to clarify which negative interactions 
are influenced by mediators that are overcompensated by positive effects in the black-
box relations and therefore cannot be observed. 
The diversity of the underlying methods and operationalizations of primary studies 
are frequently cited as arguments against meta-analyses (Fricke and Treinies 1985, p. 
169ff.). For example, the rationality and the intensity of the strategic planning process 
are not separated in older studies. Because of the diverse operationalizations, the least 
common denominator for the interaction between both constructs is that a deliberate 
form of strategic planning is advantageous in comparison to unintended or nonexistent 
strategic planning. However, it should be noted that the transformation of different 
statistical measures in comparable effect sizes during the meta-analysis makes the re-
search results more comparable. Meta-analysis is explicitly designed to analyze whether 
statistically robust results, in the sense of a method triangulation, can be derived for 
different operationalizations (Hunter and Schmidt 2004). 
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Meta-analyses are also intended to integrate studies that result in unclear or non-sig-
nificant results (Rustenbach 2003). Studies without significant interactions can be found 
particularly in relation to the discussion on the benefits of strategic planning. Thus, we 
hope that the systematic distortion due to insignificant and unpublished results (publi-
cation bias) is low in this meta-analysis (Rosenthal 1979, p. 639; Fricke and Treinies 
1985, p. 169 ff.; Rustenbach 2003, p. 38). 
For the aggregation of primary studies, it must be recognized that only a few primary 
studies are available for some interactions, which restricts or limits the meaningful 
aggregation for a total effect. Rustenbach recommends a minimum of 15 primary 
studies to enable the explanation of the study results using moderator analysis (e.g., for 
the influence of industry) (Rustenbach 2003, p. 163). This threshold is not met for par-
tial correlations for any of the research areas under study. Thus, in relation to research 
fields such as psychology or medicine that frequently use meta-analyses, strategic plan-
ning has a backlog demand for empirical studies—especially replication studies, which 
allow further analysis of moderating and mediating effects. The possibility of consid-
ering mediators in meta-analysis is provided by meta-analytic structural equation mod-
eling (Viswesvaran and Ones 1995), which is beyond the focus of this study but offers 
opportunities for future research. 
Due to the limited number of primary studies, we cannot explore whether different 
operationalizations of organizational performance have an impact on effect sizes. 
Further studies are desirable for this purpose. 
By calculating the partial correlations rather than simple correlations, we attempted 
to isolate the effects of the examined design parameters. However, the lack of sufficient 
information for all primary studies required us to consider single correlations in addi-
tion to partial correlations. Due to the chosen statistical measures, causalities can be 
assumed but not statistically proven because time lags are not analyzed in primary 
studies. 
6 Final conclusions 
As a field of research, strategic management has a history of more than 50 years. 
Within this field, strategy-content and strategy-process research can be distinguished. 
Some empirical studies focus on single design parameters of the strategy-planning 
process and their impact on organizational performance. A comprehensive overview 
that goes beyond studies on the impact of formal strategic planning is lacking. The 
existing reviews on formal strategic planning are primarily narrative. This study ex-
pands existing reviews by investigating organizational properties, strategists’ proper-
ties, rationality vs. emergence and the intensity of strategic planning. Furthermore, we 
add to narrative reviews by transforming statistical measures for large-scale empirical 
studies into unified, comparable effect sizes and by aggregating the effects of several 
primary studies for a total effect. This process was not possible for all of the studies 
because some of the published material did not allow for transformation, and some of 
the published results are too heterogeneous to allow for a reliable estimate of a total 
effect. In summary, significant interactions with organizational performance can be 
found for the functional diversification of involved planners as well as for the formali-
zation, rational implementation and high intensity of strategic planning. 
Our results suggest the potential for future research on the unexplained impact of the 
properties of the strategists and the impact of context variables as moderators and medi-
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ators. A larger body of empirical studies in this research field is desirable to promote 
future research. 
Our results allow for direct practical use by providing a starting point for designing 
and increasing the benefits of practical strategic planning processes. 
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Abstract Research on the effect of the top management team (TMT) in a firm on 
management control systems is scarce. The upper echelons theory and attention-based 
theory promise to facilitate theory building in this stream of research. This study aims 
to clarify the relationship between the composition of TMTs and the configuration of 
management control systems. This study also considers the power-structure-biasing 
effect of CEO duality. Survey data from 97 companies together with publicly available 
data are used to empirically clarify whether CEO duality and TMT composition affect 
the setup of management control systems. The results show that dual CEOs use their 
power to limit the rational approach to forecasting and budgeting but facilitate an 
efficiency orientation of management control. Certain TMT compositions also support 
this efficiency orientation; however, these TMT compositions also positively influence 
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1 Introduction 
Management control systems encompass a broad scope of information, ranging from 
formal external information to informal personal and social controls (Chenhall 2003). 
Researchers are interested in the design of management control systems for multiple 
reasons. The design of management control systems has been linked to strategic 
renewal (Poskela and Martinsuo 2009; Chenhall et al. 2011); also, it provides 
opportunities to foster innovation (Bisbe and Otley 2004; Davila et al. 2009). Auditors 
consider the design and management control philosophy while judging the complexity 
of the auditing contract (Cohen and Hanno 2000). 
Often, the contingency theory is used to predict control elements depending on 
external and internal organizational factors (Otley 1980). Researchers who focus on 
organizational characteristics occasionally utilize the upper echelons theory to explain 
the setup of management control systems. The upper echelons theory states that the 
design of organizational elements depends largely on the characteristics of the members 
of the top management team (TMT). Other researchers linked management control to 
top management by employing the attention-based theory, which predicts that the 
information available to the TMT influences the actions of its members. 
Previous research on the effects of the top management on management control is 
scarce. Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2006) showed that professional TMTs use 
management accounting systems in a rather interactive manner and rely more on 
nonfinancial information. In contrast, administrative TMTs make greater diagnostic use 
of financial information. A follow-up study showed that the characteristics of the CFO 
determine the adoption of management accounting innovations (Naranjo-Gil et al. 
2009). Cho (2011) suggested that firms’ environmental scanning behavior is a function 
of the mindset of their TMTs. Abernethy et al. (2010) found that TMT members with a 
consideration leadership style opposed an initiating structure style. The results of this 
research are similar to those of the research on the enabling-coercive management style 
initiated by Adler and Borys (1996).  
To date, previous studies ignored the fact that TMTs in many economic 
environments are monitored by boards. The power structure in a TMT may be severely 
modified when the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Speckbacher and Wentges 
(2012) recently demonstrated the consequences of a disturbed power structure in the 
TMT on management control. Although there are many reports on the effects of CEO 
duality on several organizational outcomes, there are no findings on the effect of CEO 
duality on management control implementations exist.  
Furthermore, although Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2006) produced some important 
findings on the consequences of TMT composition on the use of management control 
systems, several aspects of the relationship of TMT composition with configuration 
options of control elements remain unstudied. 
This paper begins to fill these gaps. However, the contribution of this paper is not 
limited to the findings on the effect of governance on management control; another 
important contribution is the introduction of risk taking as a moderating variable in this 
type of research. Although some important relationships can be found in an adequately 
large sample, they become much more visible after considering the moderating 
influence of risk taking. Moreover, some findings only become visible in the respective 
low- or high-risk-taking subgroup. 
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The rest of this paper progresses with a recollection of the theoretical background. 
Hypotheses are then motivated and developed. Before the results are presented, the 
methods and some important data analysis considerations are explained. The paper 
concludes with a discussion on the results and limitations of these findings. 
2 Development of the Model 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
Several frameworks for empirical studies in management control have been proposed. 
The introduction of management control systems in academic research is usually traced 
back to Anthony (1965), who distinguished between strategic control, management 
control, and operational control later renamed as task control (Anthony and 
Govindarajan 2007)). Simons (1995) developed the levers of a control framework 
which notes that management controls are more than accounting controls. By 
abstracting to belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control, and interactive 
control, Simons (1995) categorized management control not along an instrument-
oriented dimension but more along a goal-oriented view. However, other researchers 
maintained the instrument-oriented view. Otley (1999) and Ferreira and Otley (2009) 
proposed a starting control framework that also considered structural and strategic 
elements as management control systems. In 1985, Merchant began to develop a 
different understanding of management control systems, which was later evolved into 
the Merchant and van der Stede (2003, 2012) textbook. In the mentioned framework, 
accounting controls are a subset of results control, which are supplemented by action 
control, personnel control, and cultural control. The most recent approach, which also 
sums up all previous approaches, is the Malmi and Brown (2008) framework. 
According to this framework, management control can be conceptualized in three 
different layers: cultural control, accounting control, and administrative control. The 
accounting control layer is divided into planning, cybernetic, and reward control. 
Because their approach is the most recent summary of previous approaches and the 
most intuitive one, their accounting layer forms the framework for guiding the study in 
this article. 
Most frameworks employ an instrument-oriented view. However, Simon’s (1995) 
levers of a control framework are more goal-oriented; so is the coercive-enabling 
framework of Adler and Borys (1996). Coercive and enabling structures may be 
presented in many forms. One of the more recent analyses employing this framework is 
the study by Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2006) on the usage of management accounting 
systems by TMTs. Their main finding was that the professionalism of TMTs influences 
the setup of management accounting systems. While analyzing management accounting 
systems with an instrument-oriented view, they used their findings to proxy for a 
coercive or enabling use of management accounting systems: “the diagnostic use of 
management accounting systems (MAS), the use of financial MAS information, and the 
use of MAS for performance evaluation are control elements that contain considerable 
similarity to the coercive use of MAS, as that refers to more typical top-down 
management that focuses on central control, emphasizes its role in performance 
evaluation, and uses preset financial standards” (Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann 2006, p. 
30).  
The widely accepted contingency theory explains the design of management control 
systems (McMahon and Perritt 1973; Hayes 1977; Otley 1980; Fisher 1998; Chenhall 
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2003). The main finding of contingency research is that the design of management 
control systems is contingent on both external and internal factors (Abdel-Kader and 
Luther 2008). This finding is valid for the management control package as a whole and 
for the accounting layer; firms adapt their control requirements to their situation (Otley 
1980; Gerdin 2005). At a more general level, some important attributes of management 
control systems include knowledge acquisition and information distribution (Kloot 
1997). In the context of a given asset specificity, goal setting as a specific outcome 
control has been shown to be useful (Dekker 2004; Caglio and Ditillo 2008).  
Management control systems should support collaborative strategies (Adler and 
Chen 2011). The strategic focus of a firm and the consequent attention of the TMT also 
affect the design of management control systems (Davila 2000). Another influence of 
the TMT may be exercised by its leadership behavior, which may be either empowering 
or directive (Hmieleski and Ensley 2007). Specific instruments studied in the 
accounting layer of the management control systems package include the weight 
assigned to financial measures (Widener 2006; Tayles et al. 2007), allocation of 
resources (Dekker 2004, Scott and Tiessen 1999; Clinton and Hunton 2001), the 
performance evaluation process (Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann 2006; Hartmann and 
Slapničar 2009), or environmental scanning behavior (Cho 2011). 
Few studies have explicitly examined the influence of the TMT on the design of the 
management control system. Speckbacher and Wentges (2012) studied the influence of 
family members in the TMT and found that founding family members make less use of 
performance measures. Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2006) found that TMTs with a 
background in internal processes are more inclined toward process enhancements, while 
dominant backgrounds lead to a focus on key financial figures. The composition of the 
TMT influences even the strategy adopted by firms (Cho et al. 1994). Much of the 
research on top management is driven by the upper echelon theory proposed by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984), which states that organizational outcomes are at least 
partly predictable by managerial backgrounds.  
One frequently studied background property is the functional diversity of the TMT 
(Buyl et al. 2011; Cannella et al. 2008; Kürschner and Günther 2012). However, 
Menguc and Auh (2005) found that for strategy implementation, less functional 
diversity and interfunctional coordination are needed. They suggested more 
homogenous TMTs for strategy implementation. The composition of the TMT also 
depends on the relatedness of firms’ businesses (Michel and Hambrick 1992).  
Many effects on firm performance predicted by the upper echelon theory are 
moderated by the characteristics of the CEO (Buyl et al. 2011). The duality of the CEO 
and the president of the board of directors has been studied (Ho 2011; Judge et al. 2003; 
Chen et al. 2005). Indeed, Papadakis (1998) suggests that when studying TMT 
characteristics, CEO characteristics should always be studied. Among many other 
findings, CEO duality was shown to hamper the board’s monitoring function (Tuggle et 
al. 2010). Whether CEO duality negatively affects corporate performance needs to be 
determined. Negative findings (Rechner and Dalton 1991; Ramdani and van 
Witteloostuijn 2010) oppose findings with no relationship (Heracleous 2001; Carty and 
Weiss 2012). Both results are explained by theory, and Harris and Helfat (1998) 
suggested both agency theory and leadership theory to explain such findings. 
Considering all these insights and findings, it is established that many leads exist, 
suggesting that the functional composition of the TMT and CEO duality somehow 
affect the setup of the management control system. The following section presents some 
hypotheses regarding possible relationships. 
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2.2 Development of Hypotheses 
CEOs who also serve as the chairmen of the board—commonly dubbed CEO duality—
may influence the information processed in the management control system. CEO 
duality offers a unified chain of command whose usefulness particularly in turnaround 
situations was established by Mueller and Barker III (1997) and (Brockmann et al. 
2006). However, they also argued that dual CEOs may use their discretion to pursue 
their own interests, which may be a reason why shareholders value CEO non-duality 
(Saibaba and Ansari 2011). Another reason may be that dual CEOs also increase IPO 
underpricing (Chahine and Tohme 2009) and earnings management (O'Connor et al. 
2006; Sarkar et al. 2008; Chang and Sun 2009; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta 
2009; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef 2011). Few researchers could not identify an effect of 
CEO duality on earnings management (Lai 2012). However, shareholders may prefer 
that CEO duality increases the probability to pay dividends (Gill and Obradovich 2012). 
Several researchers found the negative effects of CEO duality on corporate performance 
(Rechner and Dalton 1991; Judge et al. 2003; Chen et al. 2005; Grove et al. 2011; Ho 
2011), while others found no effect (Heracleous 2001; Nahar Abdullah 2004; Jackling 
and Johl 2009; Pandya 2011; Yan Liu et al. 2011; Carty and Weiss 2012; Shukeri et al. 
2012) or positive effects (Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn 2010). The influences 
exercised by dual CEOs on their management lead audit firms to charge higher audit 
fees (Bliss et al. 2007; Bliss 2011).  
Tuggle et al. (2010) concluded that CEO duality hampers the monitoring function of 
the board by selectively directing their attention. If the CEO selectively directs the 
attention of the board, he or she may also direct the management’s attention and 
eventually that of the management control system. Dual CEOs tend to make less 
information externally available (Gul and Leung 2004; Huafang and Jianguo 2007), 
although other researchers found no evidence of such relationships (Cheng and 
Courtenay 2006; Jing Li et al. 2008). In particular, dual CEOs disclose less forward-
looking information (Cerbioni and Parbonetti 2007), partly because they themselves 
employ less external information when making decisions. Dual CEOs may perceive less 
need to rationalize their decisions with external information. Thus, 
H1: CEO duality relates to using less external information for management 
control. 
H2: CEO duality relates to lower participation in the resource allocation 
process. 
CEO duality negatively affects the relationship between innovative efforts and 
performance (Jermias 2007). One possible explanation might be that the CEO exercises 
better control of the resource allocation process if he or she is also chairman of the 
board. Peng et al. (2010) found the effect of interaction of CEO duality and 
organizational slack on organizational performance. However, this interaction effect is 
positive instead of negative. Moreover, Min-Hsien Chiang and Jia-Hui Lin (2007) 
found that CEO duality enhances productivity. CEO duality may well lead to a focus on 
outcome optimization or more generally, efficiency orientation. Taken together, these 
hints lead to the following hypothesis: 
H3: CEO duality results in more efficiency orientation in the management 
control system. 
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The configuration of the TMT may affect its environmental scanning behavior 
(Shank et al. 1988; Cho 2011). Researchers had already found that a high functional 
diversity in the TMT supports an innovation orientation (Talke et al. 2011; Zahra and 
Wiklund 2010). TMT members participating actively in the collection of external 
information respective market information also contribute to an innovative orientation 
(Harmancioglu et al. 2010). The attention-based theory argues that “what decision 
makers do depends on where they focus their attention” (Barnett 2008, p. 606). 
Divisional TMT members are responsible for a specific business unit or division; 
therefore, they are likely to drive the market orientation of a company and increase the 
need for external information (Ocasio 1997). External information is also required to 
rationalize resource allocation decisions and new product development decisions 
(Langerak et al. 2007): 
H4: Regarding management control, divisional TMT members relate to using 
more external information. 
Menguc and Auh (2005) suggested more homogenous TMTs for strategy 
implementation. They argued that efficiency is critical for the strategy implementation 
process. Team members with similar information and interests and a symmetric 
distribution of information enjoy greater TMT decision-making effectiveness 
(Edmondson et al. 2003). For a given business unit or division, greater homogeneity is 
given when a specific TMT member is responsible for this division. These divisional 
members supposedly possess the greatest experience in their business unit. According 
to Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2006), professional TMTs need less support from their 
management accounting system because they are confident of the resource allocation 
decisions made by their lower-level peers. Divisional TMT members with a focus on 
their internal and operational processes also “tend to be more inclined toward 
improving the content of processes” (Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann 2006, p. 29). 
Therefore, 
H5: Divisional TMT members relate to greater efficiency in management 
control systems. 
However, with divisional TMT members possessing a deeper insight into resource 
allocation processes, they also seem likely to assign resources more directly. Divisional 
TMT members with their responsibility for a single business unit can be considered as a 
subgroup of the TMT. Barkema and Shvyrkov (2007) showed that subgroups in the 
TMT hamper communication: 
H6: Divisional TMT members relate to less participation in the resource 
allocation process. 
Cannella et al. (2008) showed that the effects of TMTs’ functional design depend on the 
geographic distance of TMT members from one another. One possible explanation is 
that TMT members are subject to groupthink processes to a greater extent when they 
are close to one another. Similar mechanisms may occur when some members of the 
TMT bear responsibility for a certain region; instead of being included in the TMT as 
part of a steering system, they are included as an interface to their region. Factionalism 
may enhance such identification processes when the regional TMT members feel more 
responsible for their dedicated region than for the company as a whole. Other effects 
CEO Duality, TMT Composition, and Management Control in Low- and High-risk-taking Firms 51 
that multi-regional companies face may also hamper efficiency. Rivera and Milani 
(2011) detailed that multi-regional operations face potential currency exchange rate 
problems, specific budgets, or transfer price issues (Jacobs and Larkins 1992) that 
cannot be controlled by regional TMT members. Taken together, 
H7: Regional TMT members relate to a less efficient orientation in the 
management control system. 
2.3 Risk Taking as an Intervening Variable 
The propensity for risk taking is “the perceived probability of receiving the rewards 
associated with success of a proposed situation, which is required by an individual 
before he will subject himself to the consequences associated with failure” (Brockhaus 
1980, p. 513). Researchers studied risk taking in several different contexts. Papadakis 
and Barwise (2002) showed that risk taking significantly influences strategic decisions 
made. Carpenter et al. (2003) argued that risk taking should be considered as a variable 
associated with corporate government. According to their study, the experience and 
background of TMT members support risk-seeking behavior. Risk taking supports 
change (Shropshire and Hillman 2006), and change requires management control 
systems for adaptation (Lebas and Weigenstein 1986). Diversification strategies also 
lead to increased risk taking (Hoskisson et al. 1991). Firms taking more risks are also 
more strongly committed to learning (Wang 2008). That risk-taking firms are also 
strong opportunity recognizers (Tang et al. 2009) or are highly adaptive in their 
resource marshaling behavior (Warnock 2008) supports the notion that risk taking is an 
important intervening variable when studying relationships with management controls. 
Some researchers found evidence that risk taking generally has a positive influence 
on corporate performance (Walls and Dyer 1996; Simsek 2007; Wang 2008), while 
Richard et al. (2004) found no evidence of a relationship. In a meta-analysis, Kürschner 
and Günther (2012) also found no evidence for a positive relationship between risk 
taking and corporate performance in the strategic planning context. However, this paper 
differs from the aforementioned studies in that it models risk taking not as an 
independent variable but as a moderating variable.  
According to March and Zur Shapira (1987), managers believe that they can reduce 
risks using skills to control dangers. Managers facing high-risk environments or 
situations may attempt to modify the risk descriptions by either securing new 
information or adopting a different perspective (March and Zur Shapira 1987, p. 1410). 
The outcome in environments with low uncertainty is assumed to be relatively safe. 
Complex controls are not required, and simple adjustments are sufficient (Evans III et 
al. 1986). Therefore, expecting that the previously postulated hypotheses hold only in 
high-risk environments but not in low-risk environments seems reasonable. 
Furthermore, Miller (1987) showed that risk taking is related to the power structure of 
the firm.  
Taken together, that risk taking has not been considered as an intervening variable in 
the relationship between corporate governance variables and management controls to 
date is remarkable. Thus, the author proposes the following: 
P: Risk taking moderates the aforementioned hypotheses. 
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2.4 Control variables 
Researchers found that studies on corporate governance characteristics should pay heed 
to certain influential variables that may otherwise lead to overestimated results if 
ignored. Environmental turbulence has been shown to be an important moderator in 
research on planning processes (Miller and Cardinal 1994; Andersen 2004). Boyd 
(1995) and Elsayed (2007) showed that environmental turbulence is also an important 
moderator when studying CEO duality.  
Another important control often studied in applications of the upper echelon theory 
is the size of the TMT (Amason and Sapienza 1997; Cho and Hambrick 2006). 
Carpenter et al. (2004) clarified that the TMT size should be considered as a control 
variable. However, the boards of directors may exercise an equally strong influence on 
organizational characteristics. Therefore, this study also includes the size of the boards 
of directors as a control. Finally, probably, one of the strongest factors that shape 
control systems is firm size. Miller (1991) showed that firm size affects the relationship 
between organizational characteristics and outcome variables. 
3 Method 
3.1 Sample 
To keep the results of this study as generalizable as possible and as comparable and as 
valid as possible at the same time, a cross-sectional design within the manufacturing 
industry is deemed appropriate. Several previous researchers of management control 
systems selected manufacturing firms as a study object (Simons 1987; Abernethy and 
Lillis 1995; Bisbe and Malagueno 2009). Two data sources were used in this study. 
First, a questionnaire that utilized the tailored design method by Dillman et al. (2009) 
was designed; after iterative pretesting of the questionnaire with three practicing 
accounting experts, some items were deleted because of continued criticism on the 
length of the questionnaire. The back cover of the questionnaire leaflet was 
intentionally left blank to avoid immediate annoyance. Following in initial informatory 
contact, the questionnaire was sent as a second contact. The third contact was a 
reminder included in an issue of the research institute’s quarterly journal as a thank-you 
gift. The reminder was followed by a final distribution of the questionnaire to non-
responders. All participants were told that they would receive the results of the study. 
At each company, two individuals were invited to participate in the study to avoid the 
single informant bias. However, only 9% of the participating companies agreed to 
follow this procedure. These replies were aggregated into a single reply by following a 
procedure recommend by Wagner et al. (2010). This data collection phase lasted 
approximately ten weeks. Out of the 497 contacted companies, 178 companies 
participated for a 36% response rate. 
Second, given the shortened questionnaire, some variables were collected from 
publicly available data sources. Of the 178 participating companies, 54% published 
information about their leadership structure on their homepages, resulting in a final 
sample of 97 companies. 
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3.2 Measures 
External information in management control was operationalized with two different 
measures reflecting different stages in the control process. First, external information 
appears to be essential in the forecasting process. Hilary and Hsu (2011) found that 
managers relying on successful past forecasts tend to be less accurate in the future. 
Kirchgässner and Müller (2006) pointed out that less open-minded forecasting 
managers may be reluctant to revise their forecasts on a regular basis. To avoid biases 
in forecasting, Flyvbjerg (2008) suggested constructing reference classes that can then 
be used to conduct a more rationalized forecast. An even more obvious alternative to 
overcoming optimism biases or advocacy biases was shown by Tyebjee (1987). He 
suggested consulting external advisors in the forecasting process. The scale developed 
from this short literature review is included in the Appendix. Second, external 
information in management control may also be utilized during the budgeting process. 
Spreiter (2010) showed that companies can engage in market-specific benchmarking, 
industry-specific benchmarking, or benchmarking irrespective of any industry or 
market. The scale developed for this study incorporates these levels and is included in 
the Appendix. 
Resource allocation is commonly related to budgets and the budgeting process. 
Several measures were proposed to circumscribe efficiency in budgeting. One 
prominent measure used is budgetary slack (Otley 1978), which Fisher et al. (2002) 
linked to efficiency. Different scales were developed to measure slack in surveys. Onsi 
(1973) suggested four items for the evaluation of the attitude toward budgetary slack, 
which can be considered a good proxy for an ex-ante evaluation of budgetary slack. 
Moreover, Nohra and Gulati (1996) proposed an ex-post measure consisting of two 
items. Simons (1988) argued that goal tightness reduces budgetary slack and offers four 
items for measurement. Finally, Kenis (1979) offered a scale to measure goal tightness, 
of which items 1–3 and 5 were consolidated down to two questions in this study. A 
scale offered by Milani (1975) was used to evaluate budgetary participation. The scales 
used are included in the Appendix. 
CEO duality is a dichotomous variable. TMT divisional members are measured as 
the ratio of those TMT members with a product or product group function description. 
TMT regional members represent the ratio of TMT members with a regional 
assignment. For ratio calculation, CEO and CFO functions were ignored from the 
formula and TMT size as denominator was reduced by two. A subdimension of the 
entrepreneurial orientation construct was used to evaluate risk taking. Covin and Slevin 
(1986) offered the items for the scale. The variable was median split to separately 
analyze low- and high-risk-taking firms. 
The control variables, namely TMT size and board of directors size, are measured by 
their actual head count. Size is measured as the total number of employees. 
Environmental turbulence is measured using the method proposed by Miller and 
Friesen (1983). 
3.3 Data Analysis Considerations 
The six items of the Forecasting: External view scale reached a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.64. After removing the first item of the scale, Cronbach’s alpha increased to 0.69 and 
was deemed just acceptable. Benchmarked budgeting gained a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.80. Principal factor analysis was conducted on the measures for efficiency orientation 
to validate the constructed scales. Table 1 lists the results of the analysis, which  
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Table 1 Rotated factor loadings of budget efficiency variables 
 
Attitude toward 
slack Budgetary slack 
Budget goal 
tightness 
 
Eigenvalues 1.45374 1.28109 1.83230 Uniqueness 
ATS1 0.7417 -0.0276 -0.0846 0.4419 
ATS2 0.7010 0.0518 0.0272 0.5052 
ATS3 0.6997 -0.0487 -0.0736 0.5026 
ATS4 0.1634 0.1389 -0.2837 0.8736 
BSNG1 0.0417 0.5776 0.0118 0.6645 
BSNG2 -0.1658 0.4741 -0.0878 0.7401 
BGT1a -0.0301 0.6872 0.0383 0.5254 
BGT1b 0.0647 0.5060 0.1723 0.7101 
BGT2a -0.0795 0.0124 0.8334 0.2990 
BGT2b -0.0031 0.0360 0.8384 0.2957 
BGT2c -0.0039 0.1934 0.2963 0.8748 
ATS1..4: Onsi (1973) attitude toward slack scale; BSNG1/2: Nohra and Gulati (1996) slack scale; BGT1a/b, 
2a/c: Simons (1988) goal tightness scale; BGT2b: Kenis (1979) goal tightness scale 
 
retrieved three factors, and shows that the slack scale of Nohra and Gulati (1996) and 
the slack-oriented questions of the goal tightness scale of Simon (1988) may add up to a 
common index. Furthermore, the results show that two items with low loadings and 
high uniqueness should be removed from the scales before analyzing the data. After 
removing one item from the Onsi (1973) attitude toward slack scale, Cronbach’s alpha 
increased from 0.68 to 0.78. The final budgetary slack scale achieved a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.64. According to several researchers (Simons 1988; van der Stede 2001; 
Auzair and Langfield-Smith 2005), the absolute minimum for Cronbach’s alpha is 0.60. 
Considering that the scales used were applied in several other studies, accepting this 
low value seems justifiable. Finally, removing the last item from the budget goal 
tightness scale achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84 for this scale. Budgetary 
participation also achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.63 and the risk-taking scale 
achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69.After running the regression analyses, several tests 
for the final solutions were performed. One influential case needed to be removed from 
the regressions for the Forecasting: External view. Otherwise, Cook’s d was well below 
1. The regression solutions were tested for stability by including all possible 
independent variables in each regression. The beta coefficients deviated by 0.01 at most 
and, thus, proved stable. Multicollinearity was not an issue because the VIF never 
exceeds 1.10. The residuals did not deviate significantly from the normal distribution 
and did not correlate significantly with the regressor variables. However, for two 
regressions (attitude toward slack full sample; budgetary participation high risk 
sample), the residuals were significantly heteroscedastic. In these cases, a power 
transformation of budgetary participation and environmental turbulence in the case of 
budgetary participation and a power transformation of TMT size in the case of attitude 
toward slack was sufficient to achieve homoscedasticity. The regressions for attitude 
toward slack and budgetary participation were then rerun in all subsamples using the 
modified variables.  
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4 Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis. For each model, the author began 
with all focal and control variables and used stepwise regression to identify at least 
weakly significant coefficients. Stepwise regression has the disadvantage of overfitting 
the data. The author attempted to minimize the consequences of overfitting using two 
measures. First, the variables included are already well grounded in theory, while 
overfitting results primarily in situations in which regression analysis is used for data 
mining. Second, for each dependent variable, Table 2 contains the same independent 
variables across the sample and both subsamples, thus facilitating a comparison 
between the results for the full sample regressions and the risk-taking subsample 
regressions. Presenting all relevant coefficients also allows easier pattern recognition. 
However, the best model is the one containing only at least weakly significant 
coefficients. Therefore, Table 3 also contains information on the fully step-wised 
(dubbed final) regression models.  
CEO duality ( = −0.23;  = 0.022), the percentage of divisional TMT members 
( = 0.25;  = 0.15), and size of the organization ( = 0.22;  = 0.033)  significantly 
explained the extent to which firms apply an external view in forecasting. The weakly 
significant contribution of the percentage of regional TMT members ( = .19;  =.064)  may provide further explanation. The effect sizes of CEO duality and percentage 
of divisional TMT members are nearly equal but have opposite signs and may thus 
offset one another. CEO duality leads to significantly less external orientation in 
forecasting, while divisional TMT members seem to rationalize their forecast 
information with information that is more external. The same situation may be valid for 
regional TMT members; if present, they tend to acquire externally rationalized forecast 
information. Firm size proves to be a significant positive influence on the willingness to 
utilize external information when rationalizing forecasts. The overall model is 
significant and explains approximately 18% of the variance. The explained variance 
improves only when studying the high-risk-taking subsample. For the low-risk 
subsample, no variable yields any explanation for the observed utilization of external 
rationalizing in forecasting. These results already give some hints as to what to expect 
in the high-risk subsample; as for the full sample, CEO duality ( = −.28;  = .028), 
divisional TMT members ( = .45;  < .001), and firm size ( = .32;  = .02)  
significantly explain the application of an external viewpoint in forecasting. The 
discouraging effect of CEO duality is slightly stronger than that in the full sample. For 
high-risk-taking firms, divisional TMT members clearly apply an external view in 
forecasting. In addition, as for high-risk-taking firms, larger firms rationalize their 
forecasting data with external information to a greater extent. Whether or not a firm 
employs a regional structure in its TMT is of no importance for high-risk-taking firms. 
The final model explains about 38% in variance, which is very satisfactory. Thus, 
introducing risk taking in the relationships between TMT characteristics and the 
external view in forecasting sheds more light on the relationships, indicating that these 
findings support hypotheses 1 and 4.  
Firms also apply rationalizing with external data when engaging in benchmarked 
budgeting. The significant coefficients and their signs are similar to those coefficients 
found in the external view in forecasting. For the full sample, CEO duality ( =−0.23;  = 0.019)  and firm size ( = 0.30;  = 0.003)  are significant predictors of 
firms’ usage of benchmarked budgeting. The divisional TMT member ratio ( =0.18;  = 0.07)  remains a weakly significant predictor in the final model for the full 
sample, which explains a variance of 19%. The explained variance declines to 8% if
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Table 2 Spearman rank order correlation matrix 
  
     Mean      SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Risk Taking 8.71 2.98              
2 Forecasting Ext. View 17.48 5.25 -.06             
3 Benchmarked Budgeting 10.45 5.31  .13  .50***            
4 Attitude toward Slack 12.37 4.15  .10  .12  .23*           
5 Budgetary Slack 17.52 4.06 -.18† -.03  .01  .00          
6 Budget Goal Tightness 15.61 2.83  .00 -.22  .08 -.09 -.02         
7 Budgetary Participation 22.57 5.07 -.14  .03 -.09 -.12 -.03  .16        
8 Dual CEO 0.12 0.33 -.10 -.26* -.23* -.20†  .06  .22*  .01       
9 TMT Divisional Members 0.30 0.38 -.04  .25*  .21*  .05  .18  .07  .02  .06      
10 TMT Regional Members 0.09 0.21  .07  .14  .01  .09 -.21† -.27*  .02  .00 -.27*     
11 TMT Size 5.71 2.52  .05  .16  .07 -.09 -.10 -.05  .13  .08  .20†  .30**    
12 BoD Size 5.05 2.02  .24*  .09  .13 -.07 -.20† -.04 -.01 -.02  .29**  .01  .17   
13 Environmental Turbulence 34.60 5.12  .01 -.01 -.05  .17  .18  .10  .18† -.04  .08 -.01 -.11  .02  
14 Size 2457.85 4970.80  .31**  .22*  .33**  .05 -.22* -.02  .01  .03  .23*  .14  .22*  .44***  .05 
†
 p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3 Results of standardized regressions – comprehensive models 
Forecasting External 
View Benchmarked Budgeting 
Attitude Toward Budgetary 
Slack Budgetary Slack Budget Goal Tightness Budgetary Participation 
Variables        RT F L H F L H F L H F L H F L H F L H 
Focal variables                   
1 Dual CEO -.23* -.20 -.29* -.23* -.22 -.27*       .21* .28* .10    
2 TMT Divisional Members .25
*
 -.02 .50*** .19† .05 .30*    -.20† -.10 -.27†    -.08 -.34* .13 
3 TMT Regional Members .19
†
 0.28† .17    .19† .16 .17 .17 .29† .04 -.22* -.39** -.11    
Control variables                   
4 TMT Size       -.25* -.43** -.06       .27** .41** .12 
5 BoD Size          .28** .12 .41**       
6 Environmental Turbulence    -.11 -.33
*
 .07 .05 -.28† .34* -.21* -.34* -.08 .08 -.22 .42** .19† .08 .28† 
7 Size .20* .22 .31* .30** .17 .36**             
R² .179 .187 .408 .204 .181 .295 .084 .225 .144 .202 .229 .253 .117 .292 .206 .089 .227 .121 
Adjusted R² .139 .099 .350 .167 .094 .229 .054 .168 .088 .165 .150 .183 .087 .237 .152 .059 .172 .063 
F 4.53** 2.12† 7.06*** 5.51*** 2.09 4.49** 2.8* 3.96* 2.58† 5.51*** 2.9* 3.64* 3.85** 5.36** 3.81* 3.00* 4.11* 2.11† 
N 88 42 46 91 43 48 95 45 50 92 44 48 91 43 48 92 44 48 
When stepwising further down to at least weakly significant variables: 
Variables 1
*
, 2*, 3†, 
7*  
1*, 2***, 
7* 
1*, 2†, 
7** 6
†
 
1*, 2*, 
7** 3
†
, 4* 4**, 6† 6* 2
**, 5**, 
6* 3
†
, 6* 2*, 5** 1*, 3* 1*, 3* 6** 4*, 6† 2*, 4* 6* 
∆ R² 0  -.029 -.012 .-.099 -.005 -.001 -.026 -.027 -.025 -.040 -.007 -.013 -.067 -.018 -.006 -.033 -.033 
∆ Adjusted R² 0  -.013 -.003 -.033 +.013 +.009 -.007 +.010 -.016 +.002 +.029 -.002 -.051 +.019 +.004 -.015 +.006 
F 4.99**  8.99*** 6.97*** 3.99† 5.99** 4.24* 5.21** 6.38* 6.31*** 5.03* 7.32** 5.19** 5.93** 11.13** 4.22* 5.28** 4.65* 
†
 p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
F: full sample; L: low-risk-taking (RT) subsample; H: high-risk-taking subsample 
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benchmarked budgeting is studied only for the low-risk-taking sample. The only at least 
weakly significant predictor in the final model is the control variable environmental 
turbulence ( = −0.29;  = 0.0542; the negative coefficient suggests that the more 
turbulent low-risk-taking firms perceive their environment, the less they engage in 
benchmarked budgeting. However, with the predictor being weakly significant, 
conclusions should be carefully drawn. However, the high-risk-taking subsample makes 
things clearer again. Again, CEO duality ( = −0.26;  = 0.0472	 is a significant 
predictor for high-risk-taking firms that utilize less external data for their budgeting 
process. However, divisional TMT members ( = 0.31;  = 0.0192	 significantly 
offset this effect as well. Firm size ( = 0.35;  = 0.0082	 proves to be a highly 
significant predictor of the utilization of benchmarks in budgeting once again. Overall, 
the final model for the high-risk-taking subsample explains 29% of the observed 
variance in benchmarked budgeting. Again, introducing risk taking in the model helps 
in clarifying the relationship between TMT characteristics and a specific management 
control. Hypothesis 1 is supported, while these specific results weakly support 
hypothesis 4. 
Regional TMT members ( = 0.19;  = 0.0672	influence the attitude toward 
budgetary slack. However, the coefficient is weakly significant. Furthermore, the effect 
is at least weakly significant for the full sample, which may indicate that the effect size 
is too small for the sample sizes involved. Because the change in the coefficient is not 
small for all sample sizes, a small effect that is not moderated by risk taking is likely to 
exist. The sample sizes in the subsamples are too small to let this effect become 
significant. However, for the full sample, the effect of regional TMT members becomes 
significantly offset by the size of the TMT team ( = −0.26;  = 0.0122. The final 
model explains approximately 8% of the variance with a significant F-value. The 
explained variance increases to approximately 20% if only low-risk-taking enterprises 
are considered; however, neither CEO duality nor TMT membership type contributes to 
the attitude toward budgetary slack. The effect of TMT size ( = −0.41;  = 0.0062	 
negatively influences the attitude toward budgetary slack, as shown by the highly 
significant coefficient. Larger TMTs allow for more efficient control of budgeting 
processes. Firms in more turbulent environments ( = −0.28;  = 0.0532	have a 
rejecting attitude toward budgetary slack. That the beta coefficient is weakly 
significant, together with the following remarks on the high-risk-taking sample and the 
near zero coefficient in the full sample, makes clear that risk taking may be able to shed 
light on that relationship. The final model for the low-risk-taking subsample explains 
20% of the variance and has a highly significant F-value. For the high-risk-taking 
subsample, environmental turbulence ( = 0.34;  = 0.0152	is also the only significant 
predictor for a positive attitude toward budgetary slack. The corresponding F-value 
remains significant. 
Corresponding to the results obtained from the evaluation of attitude toward 
budgetary slack, budgetary slack shows positive beta coefficients for regional TMT 
members. However, the effect is only weakly significant for low-risk-taking firms 
( = 0.26;  = 0.0712; no significant effects can be found in the full sample or the 
high-risk-taking subsample. In contrast, the coefficient for divisional TMT members 
( = −0.25;  = 0.0172	is significantly negative for the final model in the full sample. 
Furthermore, for the full sample, a greater number of board of directors ( = 0.30;  =
0.0032	results in a significant increase in budgetary slack, which offsets the effect of 
divisional TMT members to greater extent. However, turbulent environments ( =
−0.21;  = 0.0332	seem to reduce the slack. The final model for the full sample 
accounts for a variance of 18% and has a high F-value. The explained variance in the 
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low-risk-taking subsample changes minimally to approximately 19% after the 
introduction of risk taking. The influences of divisional TMT members and the size of 
the board of directors become non-significant for the low-risk-taking subsample, while 
the influence of regional TMT members ( = 0.26;  = 0.0712	turns weakly 
significant. In low-risk-taking firms, environmental turbulence ( = −0.34;  =
0.0192	leads to less budgetary slack, as shown by the larger beta coefficient. The final 
model for low-risk-taking firms’ budgetary participation has a significant F-value. For 
the high-risk-taking subsample, the size of board of directors ( = 0.43;  = 0.0022	 
again offsets the slack-reducing effect of divisional TMT members ( = −0.30;  =
0.0262. The high-risk-taking subsample exhibits an explained variance of 25% and a 
highly significant F-value. 
Interestingly, regional TMT member ratio ( = −0.18;  = 0.0722 leads to less 
budgetary goal tightness, as shown by a weakly significant negative coefficient. The 
effect is offset by CEO duality ( = 0.23;  = 0.0232, as shown by the significant 
positive coefficient. However, the explained variance is comparatively low at 10% but 
still offers a highly significant F-value. When conducting the same analysis in the low-
risk-taking subsample, the explained variance increases to 23%. The contribution of 
CEO duality ( = 0.39;  = 0.0072	 to tight budgets increase approximately 50% and 
stays significant, while regional TMT members’ ( = −0.25;  = 0.0782	 influence 
also becomes stronger with a larger but still only weakly significant negative 
coefficient. The final model for the low-risk-taking subsample comes with a highly 
significant F-value. However, for the high-risk-taking subsample, these effects subside. 
The single highly significant coefficient that explains budgetary goal tightness is 
environmental turbulence ( = 0.45;  = 0.0012, thereby contributing to an explained 
variance of 20% in the final model and a highly significant F-value. The previous 
results on attitude toward budgetary slack and budgetary slack and goal tightness 
together lend partial support to hypotheses 3 and 5. The results are mixed for hypothesis 
7; while the attitude toward budgetary slack (weakly) rejects the hypothesis, budgetary 
slack itself partially supports it only in the low-risk subsample.  
For budgetary participation, the coefficients for the focal variables are non-
significant in the full sample. TMT size ( = 0.26;  = 0.0122	contributes significantly 
to budgetary participation. The coefficient for environmental turbulence ( = 0.17;  =
0.0922	 is weakly significant. The final model in the full sample accounted for 
approximately 8% of the total variance with a significant F-value. For the low-risk-
taking subsample, a significant negative influence of divisional TMT members 
( = −0.35;  = 0.0152	on budgetary participation was found. The significant positive 
contribution of the TMT size offsets this influence. Introducing risk taking as a 
constraint raised the explained variance to 19% and to a highly significant F-value. For 
the high-risk-taking subsample, only environmental turbulence ( = 0.30;  = 0.0362	 
possesses a significant explanatory power. The explained variance declines to 9%. 
These results partially support hypothesis 6 but do not support hypothesis 2. 
5 Discussion 
CEO duality causes firms to use less external information for forecasting and the 
budgeting process. These findings are in line with the research results of Gul and Leung 
(2004), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), and Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), although 
these researchers examined financial disclosure instead of management control systems. 
On the basis of these results, one may propose that observable disclosure characteristics 
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may proxy for unobservable characteristics of the control system. These results also 
show that dual CEOs use their power to influence the board or financial reporting, 
several management controls, and the potential consequences stemming from these 
control systems.  
Interestingly, the aforementioned results hold only for the high-risk-taking 
subsample. The relationships are not significant for low-risk-taking firms. The beta 
coefficient for the full sample is for both measures inside the range given by the 
coefficients for the risk-taking subsamples. Again, these findings point to the 
proposition that risk taking may moderate these relationships. However, although the 
coefficients are not significant, they bear the correct sign and are equally strong. The 
relationships thus examined may well become significant for low-risk-taking firms in a 
larger sample. 
Another control influenced by dual CEOs is the budget goal-setting process. Dual 
CEOs use their power to set tighter budget goals and thus facilitate higher efficiency in 
the resource allocation process. Note that this result does not hold for the high-risk-
taking subsample. Contrary to the external information results, the beta coefficient for 
the high-risk-taking subsample is much lower than that for the full sample or the low-
risk-taking subsample. This relationship is probably significantly weaker even with a 
larger sample size. However, even if not significant, the coefficient is greater than zero 
with a positive sign; therefore, it may become significant in a larger sample regardless 
of the relevance. 
Divisional TMT members may mitigate the negative effects of CEO duality on the 
use of external information. The larger the percentage of divisional TMT members, the 
more rational the approach to forecasting or budgeting. These findings are consistent 
with the predictions from the attention-based theory (Barnett 2008). Divisional TMT 
members also focus their attention on specific products. Rather than being driven by 
functional information, they are more interested in product-specific information and 
thus are more likely to utilize external information sources. 
The results obtained after controlling the risk-taking orientation are significant. The 
effects of divisional TMT members vanish in the low-risk-taking subsample for both 
external information measures. The coefficients are not only non-significant but also 
very close to zero. A larger sample may not reveal any significant result. In contrast, 
high-risk-taking firms exhibit strong relationships between divisional TMT members 
and external information to rationalize forecasts and budgets. Considering this effect, 
obviously only a weakly significant effect with the benchmarked budgeting measure for 
the full sample was found. 
Divisional TMT members bring about more efficient orientation in the resource 
allocation system. However, the effect is visible only with the slack measure and not in 
low-risk-taking firms. While the attitude toward the slack measure may be understood 
as an expression of corporate culture or values, the slack measure is an expression of 
executed control. Thus, the divisional TMT members may possess more knowledge 
regarding their business area and can control the budgets more closely, which is 
consistent with the findings of Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2006). This phenomenon 
seems particularly true for firms undertaking high risks. In this light, the results for 
budgetary participation are of great interest: the proposed relationship can only be 
found in the low-risk-taking subsample. Within this subsample, an interaction effect 
may exist between divisional TMT members and budgetary slack (or participation) on 
budgetary participation (or slack). 
Regional TMT members also drive the utilization of external information in 
management control systems. However, the effect is weakly significantly for 
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forecasting in the full sample. This finding alone does not provide any conclusion. 
However, when studying only the low-risk-taking group, the beta coefficient increases 
but remains weakly significant. Therefore, that regional TMT members—given their 
market-oriented function—facilitate the use of external information, particularly in low-
risk-taking firms, may be proposed. This proposition remains subject to further testing 
in a larger sample. 
Further findings address the efficiency orientation of the management control 
system. The weakly significant findings for attitude toward budgetary slack and 
budgetary slack in low-risk-taking firms allow for conclusions when viewed in light of 
the findings for goal tightness. The signs of the coefficients of the latter measure are 
opposite. Although the findings are not significant in all risk-taking subgroups, 
concluding that regional TMT members at low-risk-taking enterprises negatively 
influence the efficiency orientation seems justified, which is consistent with the 
arguments provided by Jacobs and Larkins (1992), Cannella et al. (2008), and Rivera 
and Milani (2011). These results do not hold for high-risk-taking firms. A possible 
explanation may be that these firms are forced to better control their regional 
endeavors.  
Table 3 presents 21 coefficients in three samples; each of these is obtained with one 
or more coefficients per subsample that are at least weakly significant. Note that for 
90% of these variables, the beta coefficient for the full sample equals the median value 
of the three coefficients for the full, low-risk-taking, and high-risk-taking subsamples. 
Although several of these coefficients are not significant, this finding may indicate a 
moderating role of the risk-taking orientation of firms. Further, for all dependent 
variables, the explained variance obtained from one of the subsamples was the largest 
after separately analyzing the low- and high-risk-taking subsamples. At a general level, 
the maximum variance ranges between 19% and 38%; these values are consistent with 
and even partially higher than those obtained in other studies (Miller and Friesen 1982; 
Abernethy and Brownell 1997; Chenhall 2005). 
Once again, the findings also confirm the predictions from contingency theory; firms 
adopt their management control systems on the basis of not only external factors but 
also internal factors. Divisional TMT members’ utilization of external information in 
the forecasting or budgeting process also lends support to the attention-based view of 
management control.  
6 Limits 
Some limitations may inhibit the generalizability of this study. Small sample sizes, 
particularly for the findings on regional TMT members, allow only cautious inferences. 
Although other scholars (Ucbasaran et al. 2003; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann 2006) also 
accepted weak significances, a replication study seems attractive to improve the 
reliability of the results. Furthermore, this study contains 18 final regression models 
with 15 total regression coefficients for the focal variables and 17 coefficients for the 
control variables. At a 90% significance level, one out of the ten weakly significant 
findings may be due to chance. For the focal variables, the consistency between the 
findings and the theoretical background may be put forward as arguments. As for the 
control variables, no potential wrong conclusions were drawn in this study. 
In addition to another independent variable, this study examined the relationship 
between divisional and regional TMT members in the management control system 
setup. This TMT configuration may very well reflect the organization’s general 
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structure, which is not considered an independent variable because of complexity and 
comparability. The results also do not allow any inference on causality because 
temporal processes were not controlled. However, a likely sound assumption is that the 
structure of the TMT or organization shapes the management control system and not 
vice versa. Survey data are also always subject to certain informant biases. This study 
attempted to minimize these biases by writing to an organization member who is as 
high as possible in the hierarchy. 
7 Conclusion 
Further research is required to evaluate the implications of CEO duality on 
organizational performance. Given the nature of performance antecedents, potential 
links are likely to be small and would require large sample studies. This study showed 
that dual CEOs use their power to limit a rational approach to forecasting and 
budgeting. In contrast, they facilitate efficiency orientation by setting tighter goals. 
Divisional TMT members also facilitate efficiency orientation. However, when present 
on the TMT, high-risk-taking firms tend to use more external information on 
forecasting and budgeting. In low-risk-taking firms, divisional TMT members inhibit 
budgetary participation. The presence of regional TMT members in low-risk-taking 
firms probably requires more of the control system’s attention; all efficiency measures 
support the hypothesis that the presence of regional TMT members is related to less 
efficiency orientation. 
Another important finding of this study is the strong influence of the risk-taking 
dimension. The moderating influence of this variable potentially explains why some 
predicted relationships do not present themselves as strongly as expected. Researchers 
should pay attention to this moderator. 
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Appendix 
The survey was conducted in German. The scales presented here are translated. The 
scales taken unchanged from the literature are omitted.  
Forecasting External View Scale 
When forecasting, my firm… 
… relies on internal experiences from the past 1-7 
… consults external, similar cases 1-7 
… documents similar cases in writing 1-7 
… creates a probability distribution for the external cases 1-7 
… regularly adjusts the prognoses to changed external conditions 1-7 
… asks an uninvolved person to review the prognoses 1-7 
Benchmarked Budgeting Scale 
Please state the extent to which you agree with the following statements on 
external benchmarks in budgeting: 
When we build our budget, we attempt to align our budget with other 
companies that produce different products but possess similar supply 
chains. 1-7 
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When we build our budget, we attempt to align our budget with other 
companies that serve similar markets. 1-7 
When we build our budget, we attempt to align our budget with other 
companies that produce similar products but for other markets. 1-7 
When we build our budget for single functional areas or processes, we 
attempt to align our budget with other companies that are supposed to be 
the best, even if they belong to our industry. 1-7 
Attitude toward Slack Scale 
Please state the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
To protect himself, a manager submits a budget that can safely be attained. 1-7 
Some managers set two levels of standards: one between themselves and 
their team members and the other between themselves and their superiors. 1-7 
In good business times, superiors accept some level of slack in a budget. 1-7 
Budgetary Slack Scale (reverse coded) 
Please state the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
How seriously would your company be affected if the people working at 
your company spent 10% of their time on other projects because of an 
uncontrollable development? 1-7 
How seriously would your company be affected if your budget was suddenly 
reduced by 10%? 1-7 
Our goals can only be achieved if we precisely meet our budget goals. 1-7 
We can only meet our budget goals if operating processes are free of errors, 
defects, or redundancy. 1-7 
Budget Goal Tightness Scale 
Budget goals in our firm.. 
... are set too loosely 1-7 … are set rather tightly 
... can be achieved rather easily 1-7 … can be achieved only with effort 
…are set as not very accurate standards 1-7 … are set as accurate standards 
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1 Introduction 
The large body of literature on corporate entrepreneurship shows that for organizations 
to survive and grow, innovation is not the only relevant success factor. Instead, 
innovators are initially required to take significant risks when first developing and 
promoting their innovations. Innovators should also move quickly to ensure that a 
competitor does not already occupy their new product–market combination (Miller 
1983; Covin and Slevin 1991). Corporate entrepreneurship is considered to be a firm-
level phenomenon and an organizational outcome because it more or less represents 
new entry. To achieve corporate entrepreneurship, firms should be entrepreneurially 
oriented (Lumpkin and Dess 1996).  
During the past 25 years, a significant volume of empirical research on 
entrepreneurial orientation has been published, but few studies have investigated how 
management controls may help a firm in becoming entrepreneurially oriented. 
Furthermore, of these papers, most scholars studied the relationship between 
entrepreneurial orientation and individual controls, while an extremely small number of 
studies examined more than one control. This finding is troubling because according to 
Otley (1980) and Malmi and Brown (2008), management accounting researchers have 
referred to the study of management controls as a package for decades. Malmi and 
Brown (2008) argued that controls do not operate independently from one another 
because new controls may influence other controls; therefore, a major theoretical 
question is how management control systems should be designed to achieve the desired 
outcomes. 
Miller and Friesen (1982) studied conservative and entrepreneurial firms for their 
difference with respect to environmental scanning activity and cost or profit controls. In 
this initial study, they found no difference between conservative and entrepreneurial 
firms in the use of scanning or controls. However, when Simons (1987) compared 
prospector firms and defender firms, he found strong differences in their usage of 
budget controls, cost controls, and reward systems. Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) 
simultaneously considered strategic and financial controls but could not find the 
relationship between financial controls and entrepreneurial orientation.  
These contradictory findings may be explained through different measures for 
corporate entrepreneurship and strongly differing measurement methods for 
management control systems. Simons (1987) is the only study to date that considered a 
complete accounting layer of the management control package. However, this study is 
not truly comparable because the applied measure for entrepreneurial orientation does 
not fit within that stream of literature. One more reason may explain these different 
findings. Until now, not a single study has considered the potential moderating effect of 
budgetary participation on the relationship between management control systems and 
entrepreneurial orientation. This finding is surprising because controls that are intended 
to influence employee behavior should obviously consider the active involvement of 
these employees in the goal-setting process. Involvement ensures a higher commitment 
to agreed-on targets and a more business-requirements-oriented planning process. Thus, 
assuming that the effect of management controls on the entrepreneurial orientation is 
intensified by combining these controls with budgetary participation seems reasonable. 
Whether this assumption holds has not been previously researched. 
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This study sets out to bridge this gap. Furthermore, it contributes to the stream of 
research on management controls and entrepreneurial orientation by focusing on the 
subdimensions instead of considering the full construct. Hughes and Morgan (2007) 
and Covin and Wales (2012) provided several arguments for considering 
entrepreneurial orientation as a construct without strictly co-varying subdimensions; 
thus, a lump examination is insufficient. Therefore, the research question can be 
formulated as follows: 
RQ: Which management controls show significant relationships with the 
subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation when considered as a package? 
Do certain elements require more attention than others?  
To answer this question, this study employs a combination of hypothesis testing 
methods and traces of explorative analysis methods. Hypothesis testing is used after a 
careful review of the related literature on controls and elements of entrepreneurial 
orientation. The management controls thus identified are initially tested as a package. 
Traces of explorative methods are then used to eliminate the controls that do not 
contribute to the considered subdimension of entrepreneurial orientation.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with a short 
presentation of the main concepts of this paper, followed by the development of the 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains the sampling, measurement, and data analysis processes. 
Section 4 presents the statistical results of the empirical study. Section 5 presents the 
results for the individual hypotheses. The paper ends with a short discussion on the 
limitations of this study and presents the conclusions. 
2 Development of Model 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
Several frameworks have been proposed for empirical studies on management control. 
The introduction of management control systems in academic research is usually traced 
back to Anthony (1965), who distinguished between strategic control, management 
control, and operational control (later renamed task control (Anthony and Govindarajan 
2007)). Simons (1995) developed the levers of a control framework which notes that 
management controls are not merely accounting controls. By abstracting to belief 
systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control, and interactive control, Simons (1995) 
categorized management control not along an instrument-oriented dimension but along 
a goal-oriented view. However, other researchers stuck to the instrument-oriented view. 
Otley (1999) and Ferreira and Otley (2009) proposed a starting control framework that 
also considered structural and strategic elements as management control systems. In 
1985, Merchant began to develop a different understanding of management control 
systems; this was later evolved into the Merchant and van der Stede (2003, 2012) 
textbook. In their framework, accounting controls are a subset of result control, which 
is supplemented by action control, personnel control, and cultural control. The most 
recent approach, which also sums up all previous approaches, is the Malmi and Brown 
(2008) framework. According to this framework, management control can be 
conceptualized in three different layers: cultural control, accounting control, and 
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administrative control. The accounting control layer is split into planning, cybernetic, 
and reward control. Because their approach is the most recent summary of previous 
approaches and the most intuitive one, their accounting layer forms the framework for 
guiding the research in this article. 
Entrepreneurship may be studied with respect to an individual at the subject level in 
a truly entrepreneurial or small business context. In contrast, organizations may also 
exhibit entrepreneurial behavior, and entrepreneurship can be seen as an organizational 
characteristic (Covin and Slevin 1986). Miller (1983) treated entrepreneurship as a 
multidimensional product with respect to the following: the innovativeness for new 
product–market combinations or technological renewals, the risk taking shown in firms’ 
actions, and the proactiveness present in firms’ pioneering behavior. Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) added autonomy in decision making and competitive aggressiveness to these 
dimensions. The effect of entrepreneurial orientation on firm performance has been 
studied numerous times. A meta-analysis by Rauch et al. (2009) found an overall 
positive and significant relationship from the size effect of  = 0.242. Many studies 
treated entrepreneurial orientation as a unidimensional higher-order construct. 
However, George and Marino (2011) argued that under such a research design, 
important information on how the individual subdimensions of entrepreneurial 
orientation are influenced by some antecedents becomes hidden. Covin and Wales 
(2012) supported this line of argument and presented several alternatives for the 
measurement of entrepreneurial orientation. Thus, the present study strives to contribute 
to this research stream with information at the subdimensional level.  
2.2 Development of Hypotheses 
Whether planning quality improves entrepreneurial orientation remains difficult to infer 
from previous studies. Entrepreneurial spirits are often subject to optimism biases 
(Meza and Southey 1996; Ucbasaran et al. 2010), which may result in overconfidence. 
Rational planning approaches may mitigate the effects of overconfidence on 
entrepreneurial activities (Trevelyan 2008). However, such approaches may also lead to 
undesired results in that rationality may hamper proactiveness (Cassar 2010). 
Rationality also includes benchmarking with competitors, as proposed in the beyond 
budgeting concept (Hope and Fraser 2003). Schäffer and Zyder (2005) pointed to 
potential inhibitors in this control element; benchmarking may lead to risk-averse, 
shortsighted follower behavior instead of proactive behavior. Although some 
researchers provided beneficial findings for rational planning approaches to 
entrepreneurial behavior (Ross 1987; Spatig 2007), others concluded that rational 
planning approaches are not a prerequisite for venture performance (Honig and 
Samuelsson 2012). When the focus of the planning process is not limited to current 
product–market combinations, new opportunities may be recognized. Kemelgor (2002) 
and Tang et al. (2009) already showed that opportunity recognition in turn leads to 
entrepreneurial orientation. Simsek et al. (2009) suggested setting up an 
entrepreneurially alert information system. Droge, Calantone, and Harmancioglu (2008) 
and Kreiser et al. (2010) also showed that the proactiveness of the entrepreneurial 
subdimension is related to opportunity recognition and market intelligence. Opportunity 
recognition is related to environmental scanning behavior. McEwen (2008) suggested 
that entrepreneurial organizations learn from their environment by scanning it regularly. 
In fact, Li, Tse, and Gu (2006) showed that the intensity of environmental scanning is 
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directly related to the entrepreneurial orientation construct. Although this information-
seeking behavior may vary with the studied cultural contexts (Stewart, May, and Kalia 
2008), it seems to be an important antecedent of entrepreneurial orientation. Busenitz 
(1996) also found that entrepreneurs are more alert than managers. However, until now, 
it is unclear whether this scanning behavior is reflected in the management controls 
employed. Furthermore, these past findings do not clarify which subdimension of the 
entrepreneurial orientation construct contributes to this relationship. Few hints appear 
contradictory at first sight and do not lead to any conclusion apart from the suggestion 
that proactiveness seems to be related to the entrepreneurial orientation construct 
(Droge, Calantone, and Harmancioglu 2008; Cassar 2010; Kreiser et al. 2010). 
However, most studies expected positive effects on proactiveness. Competitive 
aggressiveness as a subdimension of entrepreneurial orientation is strongly related to 
proactiveness. Therefore, 
H1: External (more rational) information will be positively linked to 
proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness. 
The accounting layer of the MCS-as-a-package framework considers as a second 
component budgets and the budgeting process. Slack as an attribute of budgets received 
some attention from several researchers. Singh (1986) introduced slack in the research 
on organizational decision making without considering other entrepreneurial 
subdimensions. According to his studies, slack can lead to more risk taking depending 
on the type of slack involved. Martinez, and Artz (2006) showed that available slack 
acts as an incentive for taking more risks. In the strategic context, Moses (1992) 
showed that the availability of slack leads to a riskier price penetration strategy. In 
contrast, Bromiley (1991) found that risk taking is in fact driven by a lack of slack, 
which is most often related to low performance. He concluded that slack might reduce 
risk taking. Panzano and Billings (1994) supported this conclusion and found that slack 
was negatively related to objective risk-taking measures.   
Coombes (2008) introduced contingency criteria into slack research and found that 
the board must remain active for slack to allow any entrepreneurial activity. Slack 
ensures access to resources, which is also considered important for entrepreneurial 
orientation (Sciascia, Naldi, and Hunter 2006). Simsek, Veiga, and Lubatkin (2007) 
circumscribed access to resources as discretionary slack and showed that slack 
positively contributes to entrepreneurial orientation. However, controversial findings 
exist. Bradley, Wiklund, and Shepherd (2011) found that slack exhibits only negative 
effects on entrepreneurial behavior. They argued that slack leads to exploitation of 
current resources rather than exploration of new resources. Chen (2007) presented 
another point of view and called for a differentiated study of the corporate reaction to 
slack. According to his research, slack inhibits the optimization of internal processes 
but allows for the exploitation of new opportunities. Nohria and Gulati (1997) and 
Nohria and Gulati (1997) probably fueled such findings and empirically showed an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between slack and innovativeness in multinational 
companies. Morris et al. (2006) arrived at the same conclusion and confirmed 
empirically that organizations with an intermediate level of slack exhibited a higher 
level of entrepreneurship. Geiger and Cashen (2002) presented a U-shaped relationship 
for both absorbed and unabsorbed slack with innovation. Heng and Ding (2010) 
supported the notion that slack can contribute to innovativeness regardless of whether it 
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is absorbed or unabsorbed. Some researchers challenged the U-shaped relationship 
between slack and innovativeness. Greve (2003) showed that high levels of slack 
increased the intensity of R&D expenditures. Nystrom, Ramamurthy, and Wilson 
(2002) presented a positive relationship between slack and innovativeness. However, 
when approaching this research problem from a different angle, other conclusions are 
drawn. Mellahi and Wilkinson (2010) showed that a reduction in slack following 
downsizing temporarily reduces innovation output.  
Finally, researchers argue that slack allows proactive behavior in markets. Cheng 
and Kesner (1997) pointed out that allocation of slack may either promote or inhibit 
responses to environmental changes. Resources allocated to external activities increased 
responses, while resources allocated to internal efficiency projects decreased 
environmental responses. Similarly, Ferrier (2001) pointed out that slack allows more 
pricing attacks and thus more competitive aggressiveness. 
Numerous scholars support the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between 
slack and all subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation. Thus, 
H2a: Budgetary slack is positively related to all subdimensions of 
entrepreneurial orientation. 
H2b: Budgetary slack has a U-shaped relationship with all subdimensions of 
entrepreneurial orientation. 
Apart from budgets, hybrid financial measurement systems form another component of 
the cybernetic control section in the management-control-as-a-package framework. 
Hybrid financial measurement systems consist of both financial and non-financial 
performance indicators. Non-financial performance indicators were shown to correlate 
with entrepreneurship as such (Mohamed et al. 2009); however, other researchers 
claimed that entrepreneurial companies and conservative types use non-financial 
measures (Hakola 2010). Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997) analytically showed that 
prospector-type firms place more weight on non-financial measures than other firm 
types. Innovation requires organizational learning and knowledge conservation, and 
learning capabilities enable organizations to develop knowledge. Kaplan and Norton 
(1992, 1996) claimed that learning leads to innovation. Non-financial performance 
measures support learning in organizations (Dossi and Patelli 2010), build up of 
learning capabilities (Ma Prieto and Revilla 2006), and conservation of knowledge 
(Vaivio 2004). Thus, linking non-financial measures to innovativeness by Verbeeten 
and Boons (2009) is a logical conclusion.  
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996) introduced the balanced scorecard into the 
academic and professional literature, which was developed to shift attention on more 
than only financial and thus retrospective measures. In addition to traditional financial 
measures, the balanced scorecard also considers measures of customer orientation, 
human resources, and internal processes. Multiple scholars linked customer orientation 
to entrepreneurial properties. Hakala and Kohtamäki (2010) showed a positive 
relationship between customer orientation and entrepreneurial orientation. As clarified 
by studies by several scholars, this relationship is centered on the innovativeness 
subdimension of corporate entrepreneurship (Matsuo 2006; Akman and Yilmaz 2008; 
Grinstein 2008; Laforet 2009; Grawe, Haozhe Chen, and Daugherty 2009). However, 
opposing findings exist. Kaya (2008) showed an empirical setting whereby customer 
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orientation relates negatively to three subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation, 
namely risk taking, proactiveness, and innovativeness.  
Human resource measures were also linked to corporate entrepreneurship or 
innovation. Haar and White (2013) linked employee retention measures to corporate 
entrepreneurship. These measures are prerequisites for so-called high-performance 
human resource practices, which are in turn linked to innovation (Zhang, Wan, and Jia 
2008) or entrepreneurship (Morris and Jones 1993; Zhang and Jia 2010). 
 
Thus, taking everything together results in the following hypothesis: 
H3: Non-financial performance measures in internal reporting are positively 
linked to corporate entrepreneurship. 
Non-financial measures may also be used directly in bonus contracts to determine 
rewards and compensation (Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 1997). Widener (2006) suggested 
that using non-financial performance measures in compensation contracts is an 
indicator of greater reliance on human capital factors in companies. Human capital 
appraisal is another prerequisite for innovativeness. Schiehll and Bellavance (2009) 
showed that the inclusion of non-financial measures in the CEO compensation plan 
leads to higher organizational growth. Importantly, note the difference between using 
non-financial measures for organizational control and incentive purposes. Thus, a 
hypothesis with respect to measurement for compensation purposes is as follows: 
H4: Non-financial performance measures in compensation contracts will be 
positively linked to corporate entrepreneurship. 
2.3 Moderating Influence of Participation 
The aforementioned management controls are suitable for providing managers and their 
teams with “perceptions of control over the work environment and perceptions of self-
efficacy or competence” (Menon 2001) given a higher degree of information and 
flexibility. These controls are suited to creating learning situations that positively 
influence an employee’s behavior (Dewettinck and Buyens 2006). More information 
also leads to higher perceived competence, better-informed decisions, and more 
possible attributions, which in turn are significantly related to measures of intrinsic 
motivation (Arnold 1985). The opportunity to work with these controls, information 
received from these controls, and opportunities generated by these controls (slack, for 
example) are forms of empowerment (Conger and Kanungo 1988). Many scholars 
showed that empowerment is significantly related to organizational commitment 
(Howard and Foster 1999; Krishna 2007; Baek-Kyoo Joo and Ji Hyun Shim 2010; 
Dehkordi et al. 2011; Kazlauskaite, Buciuniene, and Turauskas 2012). 
Commitment is also achieved by yet another management control. Conger and 
Kanungo (1988) suggested that the first step to empowerment is participative 
management. In a seminal experiment, Cooper and Woods (1974) showed that 
participation in structured decisions leads to greater commitment to carry out the tested 
decisions. These experimental findings were confirmed in several other studies. Lines 
(2004) showed that participation in change processes exhibited a strong positive 
relationship with organizational commitment and a strong negative relationship with 
76 S. Kürschner 
 
resistance against change. Meyer and Allen (1997) decomposed organizational 
commitment into the three subcomponents of affective commitment, continuance 
commitment, and normative commitment. Direct participation in decisions leads to 
affective commitment (Torka, Schyns, and Looise 2010). Specifically, budget 
participation exerts informational effects, which lead to the goal commitment effect 
(Chong and Chong 2002; Chong and Johnson 2007). Nouri and Parker (1998) and Nor 
Yahya, Nik Ahmad, and Hamid Fatima (2008) also demonstrated high organizational 
commitment as a consequence of budgetary participation. 
Budgetary participation also moderates relationships between various leadership 
styles and work outcome (Kyi and Parker 2008). The influence of slack or budgetary 
tightness on managerial performance is also moderated by budgetary participation (Lau 
and Buckland 2000). According to Lau and Buckland (2001), variances in the observed 
relationship could be explained by trust. Leach-Lopez, Stammerjohan, and McNair 
(2007) challenged this assumption by suggesting instead that the information and 
communication aspect of budgetary participation mediates its positive effect on 
organizational performance. Scholars suggested other potential moderators for the 
positive effect of budgetary participation on performance, i.e., instrumentality of the 
budget (Aranya 1990) or the degree of agreement on evaluation criteria for goal 
achievement (Dunk 1990). 
This short discussion demonstrates that many points of contact or even intersections 
exist between the management controls mentioned in the first section and budgetary 
participation. The participation of subordinates in budgeting strongly influences the 
degree of job involvement and commitment to organizational goals. Assuming that 
participation thus moderates the relationship between the aforementioned controls and 
the subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation appears reasonable, the following 
hypothesis can be put forth: 
H5: Budgetary participation moderates the relationship between management 
control systems and subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation. 
2.4 Control Variables 
Scholars found that studies on management control systems or entrepreneurial 
orientation should pay heed to some influential variables, which may otherwise lead to 
overestimated results if ignored. Environmental turbulence was shown to be an 
important moderator in research on planning processes (Miller and Cardinal 1994; 
Andersen 2004).  
Hendricks et al. (2012) showed that the adoption of a balanced scorecard was much 
more likely in larger firms. Similarly, Snell (1992) demonstrated a positive relationship 
between firm size and the likelihood of executive use of human resource management 
control systems. The negative influence of family involvement on the use of certain key 
performance indicators is also moderated by firm size (Speckbacher and Wentges 
2012). Firm size is also a predictor for the use of intelligence systems by companies 
(Mario Franco, Andre Magrinho, and Joaquim Ramos Silva 2011). With respect to 
entrepreneurial orientation, size and other factors affect the entrepreneurial orientation 
of a company (Xueming Luo, Lianxi Zhou, and Liu 2005). Yordanova (2011) 
confirmed that smaller firms achieve less corporate entrepreneurship. However, other 
researchers found no direct (Wolff and Pett 2006) or moderating (Heyde Fernandes and 
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dos Santos 2008) influence of firm size on entrepreneurial attributes. Size influences 
other key variables as well. Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and Parzen (2009) meta-analyzed 
several studies and found that size is a strong driver of organic sales growth. In 
addition, Lal (2004) discussed the positive relationship between size of operations and 
export performance. 
Another often-considered control is the environment. When Miller (1983) first 
conceptualized entrepreneurial orientation, he already considered the significant 
positive influence of environmental dynamism. Frank, Kessler, and Fink (2010) later 
confirmed his findings in a replication study. Lumpkin and Dess (2001) showed that 
proactiveness is more effective in dynamic environments. More entrepreneurial 
managers perceive environments to be more uncertain (Weaver et al. 2002). 
Environmental dynamism also moderates the relationship between managerial 
characteristics and entrepreneurial orientation (Entrialgo 2002). Finally, when studying 
performance effects, Wang and Guo (2007) found that environmental uncertainty 
interacts with entrepreneurial orientation with respect to performance. However, 
Yamada and Eshima (2009) found no moderating influence for the same relationship. 
3 Method 
3.1 Sample 
Several other prior studies on management control systems selected manufacturing 
firms as a study object (Simons 1987; Abernethy and Lillis 1995; Bisbe and Malagueno 
2009). A questionnaire was designed following the tailored design method by Dillman, 
Smyth, and Christian (2009); after iterative pretesting of the questionnaire with three 
practicing accounting experts, some items were deleted because of continued criticism 
on questionnaire length. The back cover of the questionnaire leaflet was intentionally 
left blank to avoid immediate annoyance. Following a first informatory contact, the 
questionnaire was sent as a second contact. The third contact as a reminder included an 
issue of the research institute’s quarterly journal as a thank-you gift. The reminder was 
followed by a final distribution of the questionnaire to non-responders. All participants 
were told that they would receive the results of the study. In each company, two 
individuals were invited to participate in the study to avoid the single informant bias. 
However, only 9% of the participating companies agreed to follow this procedure. 
These replies were aggregated into a single reply by following a procedure recommend 
by Wagner, Rau, and Lindemann (2010). This data collection phase lasted for 
approximately ten weeks. Out of the 497 contacted companies, a total of 178 companies 
participated, resulting in a response rate of 36%. 
3.2 Measures 
To keep the results of this study as generalizable as possible—as comparable and valid 
as possible at the same time—a cross-sectional self-report survey design within the 
manufacturing industry was deemed appropriate. Some scholars criticized self-reported 
surveys for an assumed inherent vulnerability to common method bias. However, the 
data used in this study were only accessible using internal data sources. In this case, 
Conway and Lance (2010) recommended the use of widely validated constructs, which 
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was the case for the entrepreneurial subdimension measures and for most of the 
management control measures. The scales for external information in forecasting and 
benchmarked budgeting have been recently developed. However, Rindfleisch et al. 
(2008) explained that the measures most subject to the common method bias are 
abstract measures derived from socio-psychological research. External information in 
management control was operationalized with two different measures that reflected 
different stages of the control process. First, external information appears essential in 
the forecasting process. Hilary and Hsu (2011) found that managers that rely on 
successful past forecasts tend to be less accurate in the future. Kirchgässner and Müller 
(2006) pointed out that less open-minded forecasting managers may be reluctant to 
revise their forecasts on a regular base. To avoid biases in forecasting, Flyvbjerg (2008) 
suggested constructing reference classes that could be used to conduct a more 
rationalized forecast. Thebjee (1987) showed another obvious alternative to overcome 
optimism biases or advocacy biases. He suggested consulting external advisors in the 
forecasting process. The scale developed from this short literature review is included in 
the Appendix. Second, external information in management controls may also be 
utilized during the budgeting process. Spreiter (2010) showed that companies can 
engage in market-specific benchmarking, industry-specific benchmarking, or 
benchmarking irrespective of any industry or market. The scale developed for this study 
incorporates these levels and is again included in the Appendix. Thus, it becomes 
apparent that these measures are not exactly socio-psychological measures and should 
not suffer from the common method bias. 
Different scales were developed to evaluate slack in surveys. Onsi (1973) suggested 
four items to measure attitude toward budgetary slack, which can be considered a good 
proxy for an ex-ante measure of budgetary slack. Nohria and Gulati (1996) proposed a 
more ex-post measure consisting of two items. Simons (1988) argued that goal tightness 
reduces budgetary slack and offers four items for measurement. Finally, Kenis (1979) 
offered a scale to also measure goal tightness, and the scale’s items 1–3 and 5 were 
consolidated down to two questions in this study. A scale offered by Milani (1975) 
measured budgetary participation. The scales used are included in the Appendix. 
Non-financial performance measures include the total number of non-financial 
indicators divided by the total number of performance indicators used in internal 
reporting. The indicators are derived from balanced scorecard studies (Hoque and 
James 2000; Hoque 2005; Dossi and Patelli 2010). The control variable size is 
measured as the total number of employees. Miller and Friesen (1983) measured 
environmental turbulence. 
The entrepreneurial orientation scale developed by Miller and Friesen (1982) and 
Covin and Slevin (1986) was widely used in empirical research. Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) proposed a modified version with the additional subdimensions of competitive 
aggressiveness and autonomy. The current study employs a version of the scale as 
utilized by Lumpkin (1996) that ignores the autonomy subdimension. The autonomy 
subdimension of entrepreneurial orientation overlaps with the administrative layer of 
the management control framework of Malmi and Brown (2008). Morris et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that autonomy might be used as well as an antecedent of entrepreneurial 
orientation. The decision was made to use the Lumpkin (1996) scale to avoid confusion 
in the interpretation of the results.  
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3.3 Data Analysis Considerations 
The six items of the Forecasting: External view scale reached a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.63. After removing the first item of the scale, Cronbach’s alpha rose to 0.67 and was 
deemed acceptable. Benchmarked budgeting gained a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.80. 
Principal-factor analysis was conducted on the measures of slack to validate the 
constructed scales. Table 1 presents the results of the analysis, which retrieved three 
factors. The results show that the slack scale of Nohria and Gulati (1996) and the slack-
oriented questions of Simon’s (1988) goal tightness scale may be added up to a 
common index. This scale may be understood as the need for efficiency orientation, 
which is reverse-coded for the purpose of this study. Furthermore, the results show that 
two items with low loadings and high uniqueness should be removed from the scales 
before analyzing the data. After removing one item from the Onsi (1973) attitude 
toward slack scale, Cronbach’s alpha rose from 0.76 to 0.81. The final budgetary slack 
scale achieves a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.64. According to several authors (Simons 1988; 
van der Stede 2001; Auzair and Langfield-Smith 2005), the absolute minimum value of 
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.60. Considering that the scales used were applied in several other 
studies, accepting this low value seems justifiable. Finally, after removing the last item 
from the budget goal tightness scale, a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81 for this scale was 
achieved. Budgetary participation also reached a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66. The 
subdimensions of the entrepreneurial orientation scale, widely used in scholarly 
research, reached a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67 for risk taking, 0.68 for innovativeness, 
0.69 for proactiveness, and 0.68 for competitive aggressiveness. 
After conducting regression analyses, several diagnostic tests for the final solutions 
were performed. No influential cases were found as Cook’s distance was always less 
than 4/N. Multicollinearity was not an issue, as the VIF never exceeded 1.53. Some 
residuals violated the assumption of normal distributed error terms, which was 
corrected through a power transformation of the dependent variables risk taking 
( = 0.5) and innovativeness ( = 2). The White test for heteroscedasticity revealed no 
significant results. The variables used to calculate the interaction effect with budgetary 
participation were mean-centered to avoid multicollinearity.   
Table 1 Rotated factor loadings of slack variables 
 Attitude toward slack Budgetary slack Budget goal tightness  
Eigenvalues 1.99107 1.12607 1.44775 Uniqueness 
ATS1 
 0.7498  0.0401 -0.0876 0.4285 
ATS2 
 0.7354 -0.0276  0.0534 0.4556 
ATS3 
 0.7477 -0.0534 -0.1003 0.4281 
ATS4  0.3497  0.1190 -0.2105 0.8193 
BSNG1  0.0272 
 0.6086  0.0100 0.6287 
BSNG2 -0.0971 
 0.5483 -0.0560 0.6868 
BGT1a -0.0070 
 0.6150  0.1012 0.6115 
BGT1b  0.0197 
 0.4448  0.1801 0.7694 
BGT2a -0.0533  0.0155 
 0.7683 0.4066 
BGT2b -0.0520  0.0396 
 0.7838 0.3813 
BGT2c -0.0907  0.2050  0.3611 0.8193 
ATS1..4: Onsi (1973) attitude toward slack scale; BSNG1/2: Nohria and Gulati (1996) slack scale; BGT1a/b, 
2a/c: Simons (1988) goal tightness scale; BGT2b: Kenis (1979) goal tightness scale 
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4 Results 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the regression analysis. For each model, the 
researcher began with all of the focal and control variables and used stepwise regression 
to identify at least weakly significant coefficients. Stepwise regression entails the 
danger of overfitting the data. The author attempted to minimize the consequences of 
overfitting by using two measures. First, the variables included are already well 
grounded in theory, while overfitting results primarily in situations in which regression 
analysis is used for data mining. Second, for each dependent variable, Table 4 contains 
the same independent variables across the sample and both subsamples, facilitating a 
comparison between the results for the full-sample regressions and the risk-taking 
subsample regressions. Presenting all relevant coefficients also allows easier pattern 
recognition. However, the best model is the one that contains only at least weakly 
significant coefficients. Therefore, Table 3 also contains information on the fully 
stepwise (dubbed final or identification) regression models. 
None of the stepwise regressions revealed any significant relationship for the 
variable non-financial measures in reward and compensation, while the results obtained 
for non-financial measures in internal reporting were satisfactory. Therefore, Tables 3 
and 4 do not present this variable. 
Table 5 presents a closer examination of the relationship of the slack measures with 
the subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation to identify potential U-shaped 
relationships. To do so, the linear term and the quadratic term were treated as a block in 
a manual stepwise regression procedure (Brannick 2010). 
The risk-taking subdimension of entrepreneurial orientation in the full sample is 
influenced significantly only by firm size ( = 0.19;  = 0.011), which results in a 
low explained variance of 3.7%. However, the impression changes after splitting the 
sample into low and high budgetary participation companies. For low-participation 
companies, the results hold steady with only firm size ( = 0.25;  = 0.018) as a 
significant predictor of risk taking. The explained variance improves slowly to 6.2%. 
The findings obtained for the high-participation subsample are in contrast to these 
results. Benchmarked budgeting is highly significant ( = −0.23;  = 0.025) and 
negatively related to risk taking when budgetary participation is high. This effect is 
offset by attitude toward budgetary slack, which is highly significant ( = 0.29;  =0.005) and positively related to risk taking. Surprisingly, goal tightness is also 
positively ( = 0.22;  = 0.044) related to risk taking. Of the control variables, instead 
of size, environmental turbulence can be significantly positively linked ( = 0.25;  =0.020) to risk taking. In the high-participation subsample, the explained variance 
increases to 21.4% and the F-value becomes strongly significant, suggesting that this 
model is very well suited to explain risk taking in this group. For a comparison of the 
supportive effect of these management control elements for the risk-taking 
subdimension of entrepreneurial orientation, rerunning the regressions with all relevant 
variables included in all subsamples is necessary. The first columns of Table 4 present 
the results. The coefficients for benchmarked budgeting, attitude toward budgetary 
slack, budgetary goal tightness, and environmental turbulence are all non-significant for 
the full sample and the low-participation subsample. However, as indicated by the first 
three columns in Table 4, the beta coefficients for the full-sample variables are always 
between the coefficients for the low-participation and high-participation subsamples. 
Given -error cumulation, a statistical test for these differences is not
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Table 2 Spearman rank order correlation matrix 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Risk taking 8.85 2.92             
2 Innovativeness 13.53 3.28  .27***            
3 Proactiveness 13.41 3.06  .14†  .45***           
4 Competitive aggressiveness 9.49 2.04  .26**  .24**  .26**          
5 Forecasting: external view 17.66 5.14  .02  .15†  .18*  .09         
6 Benchmarked budgeting 10.11 5.09  .07  .13†  .04  .01  .44***        
7 Attitude toward slack 10.18 3.77  .13 -.12 -.11  .12  .09  .19*       
8 Budgetary slack 17.48 4.04 -.12 -.03 -.10  .10  .00  .04  .01      
9 Budgetary goal tightness 10.51 2.03  .00  .09 -.03 -.05 -.06  .04 -.14†  .08     
10 Non-financial measures in internal reporting 0.52 0.11 -.04  .18*  .26*** -.02  .16*  .08 -.16*  .03  .07    
11 Budgetary participation 22.87 5.14 -.13 -.05  .06  .00  .09 -.07 -.10 -.03  .07  .00   
12 Size 1913.89 4243.56  .19*  .13  .16†  .05  .18*  .22**  .06 -.11  .04 -.03  .07  
13 Environmental turbulence 35.08 5.19  .03  .11 -.07  .21**  .04  .09 -.02  .14†  .15†  .11  .11  .01 
†
 p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; N=160 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 Results of standardized regressions – final (identification) models 
Risk Taking Innovativeness Proactiveness 
Competitive 
Aggressiveness 
Variables      BP F L H F L H F L H F L H 
Focal variables             
 
Forecasting: 
External View       .13
†
  .33** .15†  .32** 
 
Benchmarked 
Budgeting   -.23
*
  .25*    -.24*   -.23* 
 
Attitude Toward 
Budgetary Slack   .29
**
  -.28*   -.18†    .26* 
 Budgetary Slack         .23*    
 
Budgetary Goal 
Tightness   .22
*
          
 
Non-Financial 
Measures    .14
†
   .27*** .34** .20† -.14† -.17†  
Control 
variables             
 
Environmental 
Turbulence   .25
*
  .19†     .30*** .20† .43*** 
 Size .19* .25*  .14†    .23*     
R² .037 .062 .214 .160 .134  .101 .219 .212 .118 .071 .299 
Adjusted R² .031 .052 .174 .119 .102  .090 .191 .171 .101 .049 .261 
F 6.61* 5.79* 5.30*** 3.91** 4.27**  9.22*** 7.78** 5.14* 7.17*** 3.28* 7.79*** 
N 170 87 83 164 85 79 166 85 81 164 85 79 
†
 p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
feasible. Nevertheless, the differences between the low-participation and high-
participation samples are clearly visible and suited to offer at least some hints toward 
the proposed relationship. 
Surprisingly, only very few management controls can be linked to innovativeness. Both 
non-financial performance measures ( = 0.14;  = 0.063) and the control variable 
organizational size ( = 0.14;  = 0.055) are weakly significant in the full sample. 
However, this model still accounts for a variance of 16% and has a highly significant F-
value, suggesting that it fits the data well. Interestingly, after introducing budgetary 
participation as a moderating variable, other significant predictors appear for the low-
participation-taking subsample but none for the high-participation-taking subsample. 
For low-participation companies, benchmarked budgeting ( = 0.25;  = 0.023) is 
significantly positively linked to innovativeness. This effect is offset by attitude toward 
budgetary slack, which is significantly negatively linked ( = −0.28;  = 0.011) to 
innovativeness. Instead of size, the control environmental turbulence is weakly 
significantly linked ( = 0.19;  = 0.064) but positively linked to innovativeness in 
low-participating companies. The models still accounts for 13.4% of the variance, but 
this figure is less than that for the full sample. With a highly significant F-value, the 
model is suited to explain the observed data. Because non-financial performance 
measures in the full sample are weakly significant and no findings are derived for the 
low-participation sample, the high-participation group could be reasonably expected to 
hold some insights. Instead, no significant predictors were found for innovativeness. 
Again, rerunning the regression with all relevant variables and considering the 
coefficients across all subsamples again clearly shows that budgetary participation 
might be suited to explain some differences in the contradictory findings. The beta  
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Table 4 Results of standardized regressions – comprehensive models 
Risk Taking Innovativeness Proactiveness 
Competitive 
Aggressiveness 
Variables      
BP F L H F L H F L H F L H 
Focal variables             
1 Forecasting: External View       .16
*
 -.03 .35** .16* .00 .34** 
2 Benchmarked Budgeting -.04 .17 -.25
*
 .05 .18 -.03 -.10 .12 -.24* -.08 .10 -.22* 
3 
Attitude 
Toward 
Budgetary 
Slack 
.09 -.14 .29** -.08 -.24* .03 -.10 -.20† .03 .10 -.02 .26* 
4 Budgetary Slack       .11 .01 .19
†
    
5 Budgetary Goal Tightness .03 -.10 .21
*
          
6 Non-Financial Measures    .18
*
 .17 .18 .26*** .34** .19† -.12 -.17 -.10 
Control 
variables             
7 Environmental Turbulence .09 -.04 .24
*
 .08 .20† .00    .31*** .21† .44*** 
8 Size .20* .18† .11 .14† .13 .15 .14† .19† .04    
R² .052 .097 .226 .080 .174 .055 .153 .231 .220 .128 .076 .308 
Adjusted R² .023 .041 .176 .051 .123 0 .121 .172 .157 .100 .018 .261 
F 1.80 1.73 4.51** 2.83* 3.41* 0.90 4.77*** 3.91** 3.46* 4.63* 1.30 6.45*** 
N 170  87  83 170  87  83 164  85  79 162  85  77 
†
 p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
coefficients for benchmarked budgeting, attitude toward budgetary slack, and the 
environmental turbulence control in the full sample perfectly matches with the 
arithmetic average of the coefficients in the low-participation and high-participation 
subsamples. However, for non-financial measures and size control, this conclusion 
cannot be drawn. In these cases, budgetary participation does not seem to have any 
moderating influence. The regressions for the comprehensive models also show that the 
introduction of budgetary participation raises the explained variance from 8% in the full 
sample to 17.4% in the low-participation sample. The results for proactiveness are 
significant. Utilizing an external view in forecasting is positively related to 
proactiveness, even if weakly significant ( = 0.13;  = 0.084) in the identification 
model. After introducing budgetary participation, interestingly the effect vanishes for 
the low-participation subsample and strongly increases to a highly significant effect in 
the high-participation subsample ( = 0.33;  = 0.003). No effect in the full sample or 
in the low-participation sample can be found for benchmarked budgeting. However, 
surprisingly, benchmarked budgeting, i.e., using external information in budget 
planning, is significantly negatively related ( = −0.24;  = 0.028) to proactiveness. 
Attitude toward budgetary slack is weakly related ( = −0.18;  = 0.071) to 
proactiveness in the low-participation subsample, while it is significantly positively 
related ( = 0.23;  = 0.031) to proactiveness in the high-participation subsample. 
Non-financial measures in internal reporting are strongly and positively related to  
  
Table 5 Results of quadratic regressions for slack measures – final models 
Risk Taking Innovativeness Proactiveness 
Competitive 
Aggressiveness 
Variables      
BP F L H F L H F L H F L H 
Attitude toward 
Budgetary 
Slack 
  .25*  -.20†  -.13† -.22*  .17*  .20† 
(Attitude 
toward 
Budgetary 
Slack)² 
  .12  -.05  -.02 -.03  -.11  .00 
Budgetary 
Slack           -.21
†
 -.21† 
(Budgetary 
Slack)²           .07 .07 
Budgetary Goal 
Tightness -.02 -.24
†
 .18†        -.26†  
(Budgetary 
Goal 
Tightness)² 
-.15† -.29 -.15        -.32*  
R² .022 .058 .114  .045  .017 .052  .047 .119 .073 
Adjusted R² .010 .036 .070  .023  .005 .029  .036 .077 .027 
F 1.9 2.66 2.6*  2.00  1.46 2.30  4.26* 2.83* 1.59 
N 173 87 86 173 87 86 173 87 86 173 87 86 
†
 p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
proactiveness in the full sample ( = 0.27;  = 0.000) and in the low-participation 
subsample ( = 0.34;  = 0.001). In the high-participation subsample, the relationship 
of non-financial measures in internal reporting with proactiveness is lower but still 
weakly significantly positive ( = 0.20;  = 0.063). The control variable size is a 
significant predictor of proactiveness ( = 0.23;  = 0.019) only for low-participation 
companies. Given the introduction of budgetary participation as a moderator, the 
explained variance increases from 10.1% in the full sample to 21.9% in the low-
participation group and 21.2% in the high-participation group. Although the situation 
presents itself slightly differently in the full-model regressions, model validities should 
be recognized to suffer with the non-significant coefficients present. Probably, the most 
relevant change in the full model is that size becomes weakly significant for the full 
sample ( = 0.14;  = 0.080). What again also becomes apparent is that the beta 
coefficients for the full samples reside between the coefficients for the low-participation 
and the high-participation sample. Testing these differences is also not feasible owing 
to -error cumulation. 
Finally, the entrepreneurial orientation subdimension competitive aggressiveness is 
related to proactiveness. Expecting similar results appears reasonable. Thus, the 
utilization of external (i.e., more rational) information in forecasting is related to 
competitive aggressiveness, even if only weakly significant ( = 0.15;  = 0.053) in 
the full sample. For the high-participation sample, utilization of external information in 
forecasting is significantly positively related ( = 0.32;  = 0.003) to competitive 
aggressiveness. This finding is also consistent with the findings for proactiveness. 
Furthermore, similar to the findings for proactiveness, benchmarked budgeting is 
significantly negatively related to competitive aggressiveness. The results for the 
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relationship between attitude toward budgetary slack with competitive aggressiveness is 
notable; while attitude toward budgetary slack is weakly significantly related to 
proactiveness in the low-participation subsample, it is significantly positively related 
( = 0.26;  = 0.010) to competitive aggressiveness in the high-participation 
subsample. No relationship can be found for the budgetary slack measure. Given the 
relatedness of proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness, similar findings for non-
financial measures in internal reporting could be expected. However, instead of a 
positive relationship, non-financial measures in internal reporting are weakly significant 
and negatively related to competitive aggressiveness in the full sample ( =−0.14;  = 0.069) and the low-participation subsample ( = −0.17;  = 0.096). The 
control variable environmental turbulence is very strong and positively related to 
competitive aggressiveness in the full sample ( = 0.30;  = 0.000) as well as in the 
high-participation subsample ( = 0.43;  = 0.000) and still weakly significantly 
linked to competitive aggressiveness in the low-participation sample ( = 0.20;  =0.054). Although the explained variance for the low-participation subsample declines 
to 7.1% from 11.8% in the full sample, the introduction of budgetary participation still 
raises the explained variance to 29.9% in the high-participation subsample. F-value is 
highly significant for the full sample and the high-participation subsample and is still 
significant for the low-participation subsample. Again, a review of the comprehensive 
models indicates that the coefficients for the full sample again lie between the 
coefficients for the low-participation subsample and the high-participation subsample. 
Table 5 provides a closer look at slack to identify U-shaped relationships with the 
subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation. These results reveal few significant 
coefficients. The coefficients for the linear and quadratic terms should be interpreted 
together (Brannick 2010). For risk taking, no model is identified in the full sample. In 
the low-participation subsample, for budgetary goal tightness both the linear ( =−0.24;  = 0.068) and the quadratic term ( = −0.29;  = 0.030) are related weakly 
significant respective significant negative with risk taking. In the high-participation 
subsample, a model with a significant F-value can also be identified. In this subsample, 
attitude toward budgetary slack is significantly positively linked to risk taking ( =0.25;  = 0.023) but not the quadratic term ( = 0.12;  = 0.301). Budgetary goal 
tightness is weakly significantly linked ( = 0.18;  = 0.094) to risk taking but not the 
quadratic term ( = −0.15;  = 0.166). Neither innovativeness nor proactiveness 
models with a significant F-value are identified, although the models contain some 
significant coefficients. This result is another indicator that slack alone is insufficient 
for explaining the variance in the subdimensions of innovativeness or proactiveness. 
Additionally, other control elements are required. Turning to competitive 
aggressiveness, models with significant F-values are identified for both the full sample 
and the low-participation subsample. Surprisingly, attitude toward budgetary slack is 
significantly negatively related ( = −0.17;  = 0.027) to competitive aggressiveness 
in the full sample. However, again, the quadratic term is not significant ( = 0.07;  =0.521). In the low-participation subsample, budgetary slack is weakly and significantly 
positively related ( = 0.21;  = 0.066) to competitive aggressiveness but not the 
quadratic term ( = 0.07;  = 0.521). Finally, the linear term for budgetary tightness 
( = −0.26;  = 0.053) is weakly and significantly negatively related to competitive 
aggressiveness, while the quadratic term is significantly negatively related to 
competitive aggressiveness ( = −0.32;  = 0.014). 
 
  
Table 6 Budgetary Participation as interaction effect 
Risk Taking Innovativeness Proactiveness 
Competitive 
Aggressiveness 
Basic model variables (Table 4) 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 
R² .0516 .0958 .1504 .1187 
F 1.76 3.43** 4.52*** 4.15** 
Budgetary Participation added as 
independent variable     
ΔR² .0042 .0000 .0092 .0001 
Budgetary Participation added as 
interaction     
ΔR² .0973** .0242 .0796* .0548† 
†
 p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
This short presentation of the results already offers several hints that budgetary 
participation may be suited to moderate the relationships between elements of a control 
package and the subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation. Although the previous 
presentation of the results is very helpful in their interpretation, it is not suited to 
statistically test the significance of adding budgetary participation as a control. Thus, 
Table 6 summarizes the regression models, including budgetary participation modeled 
as an independent variable and an interaction effect. Adding budgetary participation as 
an additional independent variable yields neither a significant nor a relevant increase in 
explained variance. However, modeling budgetary participation as an interaction effect 
for each independent variable shows a highly significant increase in explained variance 
for risk taking (Δ< = +0.0973;  = 0.00432, a significant increase in proactiveness 
(Δ< = +0.0796;  = 0.02252, and a still weakly significant increase in competitive 
aggressiveness (Δ< = +0.0548;  = 0.07212. 
5 Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 stated that external (i.e., more rational) information is positively linked to 
proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness. This hypothesis received mixed support. 
Indeed, companies that use external information in forecasting act more proactively and 
exert greater competitive aggressiveness, although the coefficients are weakly 
significant. This result is consistent with the findings of Li, Tse, and Gu (2006) and 
McEwen (2008). Stronger support for this hypothesis is found within the high-
participation subsample. As for the subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation, 
proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness, the utilization of external data in 
forecasting is significantly related to both of them. However, in the high-participation 
subsample as well, benchmarked budgeting is significantly negatively related to 
proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness. Benchmarked budgeting is not a control 
element capable of stimulating entrepreneurial orientation but rather a control often 
employed by companies that only react instead of acting. This finding is consistent with 
that of Schäffer and Zyder (2005). Furthermore, the results also support their argument 
that benchmarking may lead to risk-averse behavior, even if it was not hypothesized in 
this study. Thus, the measure of benchmarked budgeting is clearly distinct from the 
external forecasting measure. It is interesting to note is that this effect is only visible in 
the high-participation subsample. The negative relationship of benchmarked budgeting 
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with proactiveness or competitive aggressiveness belongs to more than one hierarchical 
level and is not limited to top management. The moderating effect of budgetary 
participation bears more significance. The beneficial effect of external information for 
proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness in forecasting is only present and highly 
significant under conditions of high budgetary participation. The coefficient for low-
participation companies in this relationship is non-significant and is nearly zero. 
Moreover, only under conditions of high budgetary participation do the negative effects 
of benchmarking for three of four subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation become 
visible. 
Hypothesis 2a states that slack is positively related to all subdimensions of 
entrepreneurial orientation. Without considering the moderating influence of budgetary 
participation, this hypothesis would have been completely rejected. However, with 
respect to budgetary participation, the hypothesis receives partial support, even though 
contradictory results are found. Attitude toward budgetary slack is significantly related 
to risk taking and competitive aggressiveness under conditions of high budgetary 
participation. Interestingly, conditions of low-participation attitude toward slack lead to 
less innovation and proactiveness. What seems controversial at first supports hypothesis 
2. Considering that the scale determined how positive managers are attuned to slack, 
one possible explanation is that a positive slack attitude under budgetary participation 
creates a perceived cushion to engage in risk taking, aggressive competition, and a 
positive control experience. Instead, conditions of lacking participation slack might lead 
to conditions in which the need to innovate or act proactively is perceived to a lesser 
extent, as proposed by Bradley, Wiklund, and Shepherd (2011) and Chen (2007). 
Hypothesis 2a is also supported by the findings for budgetary slack. Under conditions 
of high participation, budgetary slack is weakly significantly related to proactiveness. 
Whether the findings for budgetary goal tightness contradict hypothesis 2a is subject to 
discussion. Arguably, tight goals signal lacking slack. In contrast, slack may come 
absorbed and unabsorbed (Singh 1986; Geiger and Cashen 2002; Heng and Ding 2010). 
Unabsorbed slack results in non-tight goals, while only absorbed slack results again in 
tight goals. Thus, these results are consistent with other findings which suggest that 
tight goals motivate managers to take more risks to achieve these goals. 
Hypothesis 2b states that slack and the subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation 
have a U-shaped relationship. According to the results presented in Table 5, significant 
coefficients are found for quadratic terms for budgetary goal tightness and risk taking, 
as well as competitive aggressiveness—both under low budgetary participation. The 
negative sign for the quadratic term points to an inverted U-shape. The negative sign for 
the linear (slope) term indicates that at the mean value of budgetary goal tightness, the 
U-shaped relationship with risk taking or competitive aggressiveness is again declining. 
Companies with low budgetary participation could benefit from a goal that is a little 
less stringent on these subdimensions. Under high budgetary participation, no U-shaped 
relationships are present, and the conclusion from the linear relationship holds that 
companies may use tight goals to motivate risk taking. 
Hypothesis 3 hypothesized that non-financial performance measures in internal 
reporting were positively linked to the subdimensions of entrepreneurial orientation. 
The hypothesis received support for the subdimensions of innovativeness and 
proactiveness. The effect for innovativeness appears to be constant despite the level of 
budgetary participation; however, the reduction in sample size resulting from the 
budgetary participation median split leads to an insignificant effect in these subsamples. 
  
However, interesting motivational effects are visible for proactiveness. A strong and 
highly significant positive effect is visible in the full sample, with a comparatively 
stronger and highly significant effect in the low-participation subsample. A weakly 
significant positive effect is still visible in the high-participation subsample. It is 
notable that the effects of non-financial performance measures in internal reporting 
under high participation do not appear to be as strong as those under low participation. 
Non-financial performance measures are largely defined by the process and human 
resource indicators. Under high budgetary participation, the necessity to monitor these 
indicators may well become less important. Nevertheless, the effect is visible, even if 
only weakly significant, and it should not be concluded that monitoring non-financial 
performance measures is not necessary under high participation to achieve 
proactiveness. Instead, a possible conclusion is that monitoring non-financial 
performance indicators support innovativeness and proactiveness. The negative effects 
visible for non-financial performance measures on competitive aggressiveness subside 
when looking at the comprehensive models with all relevant elements of the control 
package. However, interestingly, competitive aggressiveness appears impeded by 
monitoring these indicators, even if the results are non-significant for the 
comprehensive models. A possible explanation is the more internal orientation of non-
financial measures, but determining the exact nature of these relationships calls for 
another study. 
Hypothesis 4 proposed similar effects for non-financial performance measures of 
reward and compensation. However, no effects were found in any model; therefore, this 
study does not support hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5 proposes the moderating influence of budgetary participation. This 
hypothesis is supported for three of four subdimensions. Interestingly, the 
innovativeness subdimension is again not influenced by budgetary participation. 
Although research in the context of management control and innovativeness under 
budgetary participation is limited, research in other fields such as strategic decision 
making may explain this finding. Covin, Green, and Slevin (2006) studied strategic 
decision-making participativeness as a moderator in the relationship between 
entrepreneurial orientation and sales growth. They found that autocratic decision 
making is more effective in moderating the relationship of entrepreneurial orientation 
and performance than participative strategic decision making. They also offered an 
explanation in that participative decision making results in an incremental strategic 
change instead of bold, radical moves. However, budgetary participation effectively 
moderates the effects of management control on other subdimensions of entrepreneurial 
orientation, particularly risk taking and proactiveness. These findings support the 
hypothesis that the commitment effects of participation may indeed cause these 
moderations. 
Thus, the initial research questions can now be answered. Most controls categorized 
into the accounting layer of the management control package were significantly related. 
Surprisingly, non-financial measures for reward showed no significant relationships 
with entrepreneurial orientation. However, attending to non-financial key performance 
indicators in internal reporting stimulates entrepreneurial orientation. Generally, 
entrepreneurial orientation is more stimulated under budgetary participation. However, 
adverse effects exist for benchmarked budgeting. When benchmarked budgeting is 
used, budgetary participation leads to less entrepreneurial orientation. In these cases, 
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the adaptation of other companies’ experiences by budget-participating staff leads to 
risk avoidance and rather passive behavior.  
These findings somehow contradict the findings of Miller and Friesen (1982), who 
found no relationships with controls. One explanation may be the different and more 
comprehensive control framework and measures in this study. The results of this study 
obtained by unboxing the prospector firm type into four subdimensions of 
entrepreneurial orientation are consistent with the findings of Simons (1987). The 
identification of the relationship between the interactive lever of control and 
entrepreneurial orientation by Henri (2006) is related to the findings of this study; 
budgetary participation is one method for interactively using a lever of control. 
6 Limits 
This study faces the same limitations as most cross-sectional studies. According to 
Rindfleisch et al. (2008), common problems include the ability to draw causal 
inferences and the potential systematic error from the use of a single rater or single 
source. Some scholars propose creating a temporal separation between an initial and a 
follow-up data collection. However, as Rindfleisch et al. (2008) noted, temporal 
separation or even a longitudinal study design does not necessarily enhance causal 
inferences because most relational ties probably passed their start date at the beginning 
of the survey. The downside of longitudinal settings for any observable cases that can 
be found is that statistical testing is no longer possible given extremely small samples. 
Therefore, the choice between a cross-sectional study and a longitudinal study is the 
tradeoff between statistical reliability, enhancing causal inferences, and the cost of the 
study. Zahra, Jennings, and Kuratko (1999) pointed out that this problem is common in 
studies on entrepreneurial orientation. 
  This study also attempted to address the common-method bias; however, securing 
adequate responses from multiple informants within each company was not possible. 
Another proposed solution against the common-method bias is sampling from multiple 
sources, but this approach could not be followed because relevant data were not 
available. Furthermore, to date, no study has shown how well objective measures could 
replace subjective measures of entrepreneurial orientation, which are usually surveyed 
via mail. The study by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2011) is a promising avenue, but it 
was not validated using conventional entrepreneurial orientation measures. A Monte 
Carlo simulation by Rindfleisch et al. (2008) showed again that the common-method 
bias is less a threat than is commonly assumed. To further reduce the potential 
common-method bias, this study uses a different scale format for the entrepreneurial 
orientation scale from those used for most control measures. 
7 Conclusion 
This study examined the contribution of management controls as a package on 
entrepreneurial orientation. Drawing several conclusions is now possible. First, 
budgetary participation moderates and positively influences nearly all relationships. 
Ultimately, controls that rely on employee behavior to be effective are implemented 
more efficiently under participation. Second, rationalizing forecasts with external 
  
information is advisable, but budgets should not be aligned solely with competitors, 
particularly under conditions of budgetary participation. Third, slack is a controversial 
management control. Although risk taking and competitive aggressiveness seem 
beneficial to maintaining a positive attitude toward budgetary slack under high 
budgetary participation, generating a positive slack attitude under low participation is 
not advisable given the negative effects on innovativeness and proactiveness. Although 
a positive attitude toward slack may serve as a cushion to allow for additional risk 
taking, tight goals under high budgetary participation also lead to increased risk taking. 
Attention to non-financial measures in internal reporting also leads to innovativeness 
and proactiveness but is more important in low-budgetary-participation companies than 
in high-budgetary participation companies.  
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Appendix 
The survey was conducted in German. The scales presented here have been translated 
into English. Scales taken unchanged from the literature are omitted. 
Forecasting External View Scale 
When forecasting, my firm… 
… relies on internal experiences from the past 1-7 
… consults external, similar cases 1-7 
… documents similar cases in writing 1-7 
… creates a probability distribution for external cases 1-7 
… regularly adjusts the prognoses to changed external conditions 1-7 
… asks an uninvolved person to review the prognoses 1-7 
Benchmarked Budgeting Scale 
Please state the extent to which you agree with the following statements on 
external benchmarks in budgeting: 
When we build our budget, we attempt to align our budget with other 
companies that produce different products but possess similar supply 
chains. 1-7 
When we build our budget, we attempt to align our budget with other 
companies that serve similar markets. 1-7 
When we build our budget, we attempt to align our budget with other 
companies that produce similar products but for other markets. 1-7 
When we build our budget for single functional areas or processes, we 
attempt to align our budget with other companies that are supposed to be 
the best, even if they are not from our industry. 1-7 
Attitude toward Slack Scale 
Please state the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
To protect himself, a manager submits a budget that can be safely attained. 1-7 
Some managers set two levels of standards: one between themselves and 
their team members and the other between themselves and their superiors. 1-7 
In good business times, superiors accept a certain level of slack in a budget. 1-7 
  
Budgetary Slack Scale (reverse coded) 
Please state the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
How seriously would your company be affected if the people working at 
your company spent 10% of their time on other projects because of an 
uncontrollable development? 1-7 
How seriously would your company be affected if your budget was suddenly 
reduced by 10%? 1-7 
Our goals can only be achieved if we precisely meet our budget goals. 1-7 
We can only meet our budget goals if operating processes are free of errors, 
defects, or redundant work. 1-7 
Budget Goal Tightness Scale 
Budget goals in our firm.. 
... are set rather too loosely 1-7 … are set rather tightly 
... can be achieved rather easily 1-7 … can be achieved only with effort 
…are set as not very accurate standards 1-7 … are set as rather accurate standards
 
 
 
